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EMPLOYMENT LAW
Under a theory of respondeat superior, an employer will not be
held liable for a supervisory employee's sexual harassment of
another employee, while off duty and not at the workplace, if
no sufficient nexus exists between the supervisor's conduct and
his or her employment to permit an inference that his or her
conduct arose in the course of employment.

FACTS
Capitol City Foods, Inc., v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d
418 (1992), cert. denied. Mary T. ("Mary") began working at a
Capitol City Foods' Burger King franchise in January, 1989. 1
Vernon Johnson ("Vernon") was the night shift supervisor with
whom Mary made plans to go out for a drink on January 31,
1989, as neither of them were scheduled to work that day.2 On
January 31, as arranged, Vernon picked up Mary from a grocery
store; she was wearing her Burger King uniform. s Unbeknownst
to Vernon, another employee had changed the schedule and had
scheduled Mary to work that day at 5 p.m. 4 Vernon telephoned
Burger King, reprimanded that employee, and informed him
that Mary would arrive late, if at all. Ii Vernon then took Mary to
his parents' house where Mary alleged that she was raped by
Vernon. 6 The following day Mary told a manager what had happened, and quit her job shortly thereafter. 7

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mary filed a sexual harassment complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) and received a
1. Capitol City Foods, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 418, 419 (1992).
2. Id. Both Mary and Vernon believed a co-worker would accompany them; however, the co-worker never arrived at the designated meeting place so Mary and Vernon
went alone.
3.Id.
4.Id.
5.Id.
6.Id.
7.Id.

1043
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letter informing her of her right to sue. s Mary then filed a lawsuit naming as co-defendants Capitol City Foods, Inc. (hereinafter defendant), Burger King, Inc., Vernon Johnson, and his parents. 9 Seven causes of action were alleged against Capitol City
Foods, including sexual harassment. 1o The first cause of action
alleged unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex (sexual harassment) against Mary, which included requiring her "to work in
an intimidating, hostile, and offensive environment."ll The defendant moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative,
summary adjudication on this issue on the ground that Vernon
.was not acting as Capitol City's agent when the alleged rape occurred. 12 Mary opposed the motion for summary judgment on
the grounds that Vernon's "conduct was within the scope of his
employment, and that agency principles did not apply under the
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)."13 The Superior
Court denied the motion as to the cause of action for sexual harassment,14 stating:
It is undisputed that Capitol City had a policy
against employee dating. Since Capitol City at8.Id.
9. Id. The trial court granted Burger King, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment.
Only Capitol City Foods, Inc. is a party to this appeal. Id. at 419 n.!. (The court's opinion did not mention Mary's suit against Vernon or his parents.)
10. Id. The other six causes of action were: (2) intentional infliction of emotional
distress; (3) misrepresentation; (4) promissory fraud; (5) negligent employment; (6) assault and battery; and, (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff dismissed
the seventh cause of action, and judgment on the pleading was granted as to the second
and sixth causes of action. Id. at 420. Thereafter, defendant moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication of the issues on the remaining causes
of action. The superior court granted the motion as to the third, fourth, and fifth causes
of action and as to plaintiff's request for punitive damages.
11. Id. at 419. The primary factual allegation supporting this cause of action read:
On January 31, 1989, defendant Johnson, in abusing his position of authority as shift manager and supervisor of plaintiff
Mary [T.], instructed plaintiff Mary [T.], who was dressed in
her Burger King uniform and about to enter the premises. . .
to report to her regularly assigned shift, to get into his car and
accompany him to his residence. Defendant Johnson advised
her that he had made arrangements so that she would not
have to punch in on the time clock at work at that time. Defendant Johnson thereupon transported plaintiff Mary [T.] to
his residence . . . and raped her.
[d.

12. [d. at 420. Defendant asserted that under Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 72 (1986), agency principles should be applied in sexual harassment cases.
13. Capitol City Foods, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 420.
14. [d.
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tempted to regulate off-premises activity and
made it a part of its role as an employer, the
court cannot find as a matter of law that violation
of the rule is not foreseeable and not within the
employment relationship. 15

The court stated that the statutory scheme recognizing sexual
harassment as a workplace hazard l6 broadened the analysis of
[common law] agency; a different agency analysis is therefore
used under the FEHA than under common law. 17 The court
stated that California Government Code section 12940, subdivision (h) imposes liability on an employer for the acts of an agent
or supervisor, and Vernon's position as Mary's supervisor was
undisputed. IS Capitol City petitioned the Third District Court of
Appeal for a peremptory writ of mandate directing the Superior
Court to set aside and vacate its order denying the motion for
summary judgment and to enter an order granting the motion in
its entirety, or for an alternative writ ordering the trial court to
take such action or show cause why the writ should not be
granted. 19
COURT'S ANALYSIS
The FEHA makes it unlawful for an employer, or anyone
acting as an agent of the employer, to harass an employee because of gender. 20 Regulations promulgated under the FEHA indicate that under the theory of respondeat superior, an employer
is liable for harassment by supervisors, managers, or agents committed within the scope of employment or the relationship with
the employer.21 Harassment is defined to include physical
harassment. 22
15. Id.
16. The court here is referring to the statutory scheme of the Fair Employment and
Housing Act (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12900-40).
17. Capitol City Foods, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 420.
18.Id.
19.Id.
20. CAL. Gov'T CODE §12940(h) (West 1992). In contrast to harassment by a supervisor, harassment by an employee other than a supervisor or an agent is unlawful only if
the employer or the agent knows or should know of the conduct and fails to take immediate corrective action.
21. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7286.6 (b) (1992).
22. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7287.6 (b)(1)(B) (1992).
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I. SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT

Under a theory of respondeat superior, the plaintiff must
establish that the defendant was acting within the scope of his
or her employment or as the defendant's agent. 23 Capitol City
argued that before an employer can be held strictly liable for the
harassing conduct of a supervisory employee, agency principles
must first be applied. 2 • They contended that the trial court
erred by "applying a broader concept of agency than that of the
common law,211 and the court should have applied the agency
analysis set forth in John R. u. Oakland Unified School District."26 Capitol City urged that the undisputed evidence revealed an insufficient nexus between Vernon's conduct and his
employment to permit the inference that his conduct arose in
the course of his employment. 27 Therefore, Capitol City asserted
that the issue must be determined in the negative as a matter of
law. 28 However, Mary alleged that Vernon was acting under his
authority as 'shift manager and supervisor at the time of the .
harassment. 29
23. Capitol City Foods, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 422. See Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula
Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1989). (Respondeat superior is an element of a prima facie
case of environmental sexual harassment.)
24. Capitol City Foods, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 421.
25. Under common law agency principles, a master is liable 'for the torts of his servant if the servant was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of an agency
relationship. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 219 (2)(d) (1958).
Under this theory of agency, an employer may be liable when a supervisory employee uses the authority of his position to sexually harass another employee. Capitol
City Foods, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 422 n.2.
26. Capitol City Foods, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 421 (citing John R. v. Oakland Unified
School Dist., 256 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1989)). In John R., the court set forth the general principles of respondeat superior which holds an employer liable for the torts of its employees, committed within the scope of employment. 256 Cal. Rptr. 766 at 771. Whether an
employer is acting within the scope of employment is generally a question of fact; however, if the undisputed evidence would not support an inference that the employee was
acting within the scope of employment, it becomes a question of law. [d. The scope of
employment is viewed broadly and may cover acts outside the ultimate object of employment; however, the employer is not liable if the employee substantially departs from his
or her duties for purely personal reasons.
. 27. Capitol City Foods, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 421. Defendant points to the undisputed
facts that Vernon was off duty during the incident, the parties agreed to the date, and
there was no evidence Johnson used his authority as a supervisor to compel Mary's presence. She did not object to going with him and there was no evidence of coercion. [d. at
421-22.
28. [d. at 421.
29. [d. at 422.
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WORK-RELATED CONDUCT

Precedential decisions of the' FEHC have recognized that
while harassing conduct need not occur in the workplace, it must
occur within a work-related context: 30
While the offending conduct may and often does
occur at the place of work, it need not. Unwelcome sexual conduct perpetrated by an agent, supervisor, or co-worker, which occurs elsewhere but
is in some fashion work-related constitutes sexual
harassment within the meaning of the Fair Employment and Housing Act. 31

In determining whether sexually harassing conduct is work-related, the FEHC has applied common law principles. 32 Mary had
the burden of establishing that Vernon was acting within the
scope of his employment. 33 Attempting to show a, sufficient
nexus, Mary pointed to the following: the "date" was arranged
in Vernon's office; when Vernon met Mary and transported her
to his parents' home, she was in her work uniform; and, Vernon
exercised his authority to excuse Mary from work so that she
could be with him, thereby, facilitating the rape. 3 " However, the
court stated that Mary's argument overlooked the fact that Capitol City conclusively refuted the allegation' that Vernon forced
Mary to accompany him or coerced her in any way prior to entering his bedroom. 36 In light of this refutation, the court held
that Vernon's phone call to Burger King to excuse Mary from
work was insufficient to support an inference that Vernon was
acting within the scope of his employment or was acting as an
30.Id.
31. Id. (citing DFEH v Huncot Properties, FEHC Dec. No. 88-21, at 8 (Dec. 15,
1988)).
See, eg., DFEH v. Beehive Answering Service, FEHC (June 7, 1984) Dec. No. 84-16,
at p.19 (where a supervisor exerted and exploited his authority to compel an employee's
attendance at several meals away from the office, the use and abuse of his supervisory
status was sufficient to bring his sexually harassing conduct outside of the workplace
within the ambit of the Fair Employment and Housing Act).
32. Capitol City Foods, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 422.
33.Id.
34.Id.
35. Id. at 422-23. The court stated that the undisputed evidence negated Mary's
allegations that Vernon abused his authority by instructing Mary to accompany him because the undisputed evidence showed that Mary agreed to meet and accompany
Vernon.
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agent of the defendant. 36
Capital City urged that there was an insufficient nexus between Vernon's conduct and his employment to hold Capital
City liable for Vernon's acts. 37 The Court agreed with Capitol
City and held that Mary failed to produce sufficient evidence to
support an inference that Vernon was acting within the scope of
his employment or as an agent of Capital City when the harassment occurred. 38 Therefore, the Court issued a peremptory writ
of mandate ordering the superior court to enter a new order
granting Capital City's motion for summary judgment. 39
CRITIQUE
Under a theory of respondeat superior, an employer shall
not be held liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment of a coworker unless the supervisor is acting within the scope of his or
her employment or acting as an agent of the employer."o Yet,
from the court's opinion in this case, it is still unclear when the
employer is liable for the actions of a supervisory employee, especially those taken outside the work setting;U Ironically, the
Court did mention some cases dealing with sexual harassment
occurring after hours but while still at the workplace. However,
the court failed to take the opportunity to use those cases to
recognize, discuss, and resolve the issue of sexual harassment
outside of the workplace."2
Only one thing is clear: a victim of sexual harassment has a
heavy burden to carry when attempting to hold an employer liable for the conduct of a supervisory employee. This heavy bur36. [d. at 423.
37. [d. at 421.

38. [d. at 423.
39. [d.
40. [d. at 421.

41. For example, when will an employer be held liable for a supervisory employee's
sexually harassing conduct while at an office Christmas party or company picnic?
42. See. e.g., Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1975) cited in Capitol City Foods. The court in Rodgers stated that an employer was liable for risks inherent in or created by the enterprise. For social pursuits on the premises after work, an
employer was liable if (1) it endorsed the activity by express or implied permission, and
(2) the activity was conceivably of some benefit to the employer or was a customary
incident of the employment relationship. 124 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
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den is clearly demonstrated in this case. Mary showed that
Vernon used his supervisory authority to excuse her from work,
and it was during this excused absence that Vernon sexually
harassed Mary. However, in spite of this undisputed evidence,
the court refused to find that Mary sustained her burden of
proving that Vernon's actions were within the scope of his employment as a supervisor. 43
The imposition of such a heavy burden upon the victim of
sexual harassment is detrimental to the victim as well as to
other employees who are potential victims of sexual harassment.
Many victims of sexual harassment will likely be intimidated by
this heavy burden and decide not to pursue valid claims against
their harassers. Additionally, supervisory employees can and will .
continue to use their j9b-related power to gain non job-related
control over other employees while avoiding criminal sanctions
for their harassing behavior.
"The strictest rules of liability are imposed on the employer
and its supervisors. Their conduct is judged more harshly ...
because of the inherent control those persons have over subordinates who will comply with suggestions made by supervisors. . .
for fear that refusal will affect their position in the organization."44 However, the California Court of Appeal failed to apply
these strict rules of liability in refusing to hold Capital City liable for Vernon's action of excusing Mary from work for the purpose of raping her. In failing to hold Capital City liable for
Vernon's actions, the California Court of Appeal sent a dangerous message to supervisors, telling them only that they should
leave their place of employment before engaging in any harassing conduct. This court did nothing but stir the already muddied waters regarding sexual harassment and then walk away
leaving its audience with more questions than answers.
Stephanie L. Bradshaw*

FOR

43. Capitol City Foods, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 423.
44. WENDY A. WOLDT, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
EMPLOYERS 3 (1992).

WORKPLACE,

A

PRACTICAL GUIDE

* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of December 1993.
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EMPLOYMENT LAW
An employee terminated in retaliation for supporting a coworker's claim of sexual harassment may assert a cause of action for tortious discharge in violation of public policy.
Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 1 Cal. 4th 1083, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
874, 824 P.2d 680 (1992). In Gantt, the California Supreme
Court held that an employee terminated in retaliation for supporting a co-worker's claim of sexual harassment may assert a
cause of action for tortious discharge in contravention of public
policy.l The court narrowly defined public policy as a claim
based only on a constitutional or statutory provision;2 specifically relying on Government Code section 1297"5 which prohibits
interference with an agency's investigation. 3 In addition, the
court held that the Workers' Compensation Act did not preempt
such a cause of action because the actions of the employer did
not fall within the employer-employee relationship.'

FACTS
Vincent A. Gantt, plaintiff, was a sales manager for Sentry
Insurance ("Sentry") since 1979. 11 Joyce Bruno, a co-worker of
Mr. Gantt, reported to Mr. Gantt that she was being sexually
harassed by one of her supervisors. a Mr. Gantt told Ms. Bruno
to report the incident to higher management, but he eventually
reported it himself as the harassment continued. 7 After a meeting at which Mr. Gantt was ridiculed for supporting her claims,
Ms. Bruno was fired. s Subsequent to firing Ms. Bruno, the newly
1. Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d at 681-82. For a discussion regarding the scope of
the public policy exception, see Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful
Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983).
2. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 681.
3. Id. at 689 (citing CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12975 (West 1992)).
4. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 690 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(a) (West 1989)).
5. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 682.
6. Id.
7.Id.
8.Id.

1051
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hired sales director said that firing Mr. Gantt was a priority.9
Pursuant to Ms. Bruno's complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") alleging
sexual harassment,IO Sentry's house counsel investigated the
complaint. l l Mr. Gantt testified to his belief that the house
counsel wanted him to retract his claim of informing higher
manageJIlent of the sexual harassment complaints. I2 In March,
1983, less than two months after the investigation,I3 Mr. Gantt
was demoted to sales representative and not given any existing
accounts. 14 For the next month, Mr. Gantt was rarely in the office; he took vacation time and sick leave due to an illness. 111 He
secured another position and left Sentry's payroll in May.I6
Two months after leaving Sentry, Mr. Gantt filed a complaint against Sentry and two particular employees alleging tortious discharge in violation of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and in contravention of public policy, defamation, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. I7 The jury returned a
special verdict for Mr. Gantt. IS The Court of Appeal reversed
the verdict with respect to the individual defendants, but affirmed the verdict against Sentry.I9
Sentry petitioned the Supreme Court for review asserting
that neither the facts nor the law supported plaintiff's claim. 20
9. [d.

10. Gantt, 824 P.2d 682. Ms. Bruno alleged harassment by a Sentry Insurance employee and failure by Sentry's higher management to respond to the complaints.
11. [d.
12. [d. at 683. Additionally, Mr. Gantt was told by a co-worker that management
did not care for him, and Mr. Gantt was informed by a memorandum that it appeared as
if he were involved in an undercover operation. [d. at 682.
13. [d. During the investigation, Mr. Gantt met privately with the DFEH investigator because the house counsel's actions worried him. The DFEH investigator assured him
that there could be no retaliatory action against him.
14. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 683. Mr. Gantt testified that an existing account book is
necessary to perform as a sales representative.
15.
16.
17.
18.

[d.
[d.
[d. at 681.
[d. at 683. The jury specifically found that he was constructively discharged,

that Sentry lacked a good faith belief that the termination was warranted for legally
valid business reasons, and that Mr. Gantt was discharged in retaliation for his actions
regarding Ms. Bruno's sexual harassment allegations.
19. Id. at 681.
20. [d.
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In addition, defendant claimed that the Worker's Compensation
Act barred Mr. Gantt's cause of action.21 The California Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appea1. 22
I.

A.

COURT'S ANALYSIS
THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT

Historically, at-will employment was terminable by either
party for any reason with reasonable notice. 23 In recent years,
certain exceptions, including the public policy exception, have
evolved to protect job security.24
The California Supreme Court first recognized the public
policy exception to at-will employment in Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield CO.25 The Tameny court held that an at-will employee
has a tort action when he or she is discharged for refusing to
commit an act in violation of fundamental public policy.26
The problem with defining public policy is discerning between actual public policy and normal employer-employee disputes. 27 In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,28 the court mandated that 'an issue pertain to society at large rather than a
proprietary interest. 29 Although the court did not specify
whether this was to be based on a constitutional or statutory
21. [d.
22. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 682.
23. Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1931 (1983).
24. [d. at 1934-35. Modifications and exceptions to the at-will rule include collective
bargaining agreements prohibiting discharge without cause, the evolution of implied contract terms applied to at-will employment, and a duty of good faith and fair dealing.
25. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980). In Tameny, plaintiff, a sales representative in charge of independent service station relations for ARCO,
alleged that defendant ARCO pressured him to get the dealers to set their prices as
specified by ARCO in violation of the Sherman Act, Cartwright Act, and a specific consent decree in a federal antitrust prosecution of defendant. [d. at 1330-32. Plaintiff was
discharged for refusing to engage in this activity. [d. at 1330. The court held that this
complaint stated a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge because the discharge is
not based on a violation of a contractual provision. [d. at 1334-35. This court based its
decision on Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959),
which held there to be a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge. [d. at 1332-34.
26. Tameny, 610 P.2d at 1337.
27. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 684.
28. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
29. [d. at 378-79.
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provision, the court offered guidelines suggesting that the policy
had to be "fundamental," "substantial," and "well established"
at the time of the discharge. 3o
However, few courts recognize the public policy exception
within these guidelines and outside of a constitutional or statutory provision. 31 Examples of discharge in contravention of public policy inolude refusing to violate a statute, performing a statutory obligation, exercising a right or privilege, and reporting a
violation. 32
The Gantt court declared the public policy exception to be
limited to a constitutional or statutory provision33 reasoning that
California courts have traditionally limited public policy to such
provisions. 34 The court reasoned that this narrow definition
maintains the proper balance between the intere~ts of employers
and. employees. 311 The court also posited that limiting the public
policy exception to constitutional or statutory provisions precludes judicial policymaking because the court may not declare
public policy if the legislature has not specifically addressed it
by statute. 36
B.

ApPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION

Sentry argued that supporting a co-workers claim of sexual
harassment does not affect the public at large, but only the
plaintiff, therefore, falling within a regular employer-employee
30. [d. at 378-79.
31. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 684-85. The Wisconsin Supreme Court takes a narrow view
and limits plaintiffs to contract damages based on only statutory or constitutional provisions. The Kentucky Supreme Court also limits the public policy exception to a statutory
or constitutional provision. Texas, South Carolina, and Washington, DC, have also
adopted similar restrictive definitions. The New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted a
broader view and recognizes a tort action for discharge in contravention of public policy
which includes legislation, administrative rules, regulations, judicial decisions, and a professional code of ethics.
32. [d. at 684.
33. Id. at 687.
34.Id.
35. Id. at 688. The employer is limited by statutory and constitutional provisions
and will not be liable for other activities that might be against public policy, while the
employee has redress for issues arising under statutes or the constitution.
36. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 687.
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dispute. 37 Mr. Gantt claimed that his discharge should fall under
the public policy exception because it could be construed as arising under the California constitutional provision prohibiting sexual discrimination. 3s
The California Supreme Court in Gantt, however, was not
asked to declare whether being fired in retaliation for supporting
a co-workers claim of sexual harassment is against public policy,
but instead, whether there was a clear constitutional or statutory
provision of fundamental public policy prohibiting Mr. Gantt's
. discharge. 39 The court cited California Government Code section
12975 which specifically enjoins any interference with an agency
investigation. 40 This decision falls within the precedent of
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield CoY and Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters. 42 Both cases rely on statutory authority without specifically addressing the definition of public policy
outside a statutory or constitutional provision. 43 The Gantt
court addresses the definition of public policy by limiting it to
either a constitutional or statutory provision."
C.

THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT DOES NOT PREEMPT
CLAIM

Sentry maintains that suing for tortious discharge in contravention of public policy is preempted by the Workers' Compensation Act's exclusive remedy provisions. 41i However, claims aris37. [d. at 688.
38. CAL. CONST. art. I § 8. See also Gantt, 824 P.2d at 688. Mr. Gantt asserted that
the constitutional provision prohibiting sexual discrimination also demands a workplace
free from the repercussions of sexual harassment.
39. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 688.
40. [d. at 689. This code section is part of the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act.
41. Tameny, 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (employee could not be discharged for refus·
ing to violate a statute).
42. Petermann, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959) (employer liable for discharging employee
because he refused to testify falsely before a legislative committee).
43. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 688.
44. [d. at 687. The court admits that it is not being asked to declare public policy.
Although the court defines public policy in this decision, that language is dicta since the
court based its decision on a statutory violation. [d. at 688.
45. [d. at 689·90. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West 1989) (Workers' Compensation
Act) which provides that compensation as provided in the act is the sole and exclusive
remedy of the employee.
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ing under a Tameny theory are not preempted46 because
preemption only occurs if the claim arises out of and in the
course of employment. 47
Under the facts in Gantt, the court held that interfering
with an agency investigation in violation of Government Code
section 12975 is not within the proper role of the employer. 48
The Gantt decision addresses the public interest of not allowing
employers to impose conditions on an employee which violate
public policy.49
DISSENT
Although her dissent agrees with the outcome of the case,
Justice Kennard focuses on the majority's definition of public
policy.lio Justice Kennard finds that the court overstepped its
boundaries by defining public policy at all because there was a
narrow government code on point under which this case could
have been decided. iiI
In addition, the dissent posits that the public policy definition is too narrow because there are other legitimate sources of
public policy.1i2
CRITIQUE
The holding in Gantt, allowing a cause of action for a coworker fired in retaliation for supporting a claim of sexual harassment, will hopefully result in employees being more willing to
46. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 690.
47. [d. at 690-91 (citing Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 729 P.2d 743 (Cal.

1987» (exclusive remedy provisions are not applicable under circumstances where the
employer stepped out of the proper role).
48. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 691.
49. [d.
50. [d. at 692.
51. [d. at 693 ..

52. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 694. The dissent cites Verduzco v. General Dynamics, Convair Div., 742 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Cal. 1990) as an example of other legitimate sources of
public policy. A production supervisor for a national defense project was fired for complaining that security was too lax. [d. at 560. The court held that this discharge was in
violation to a fundamental public interest. [d. at 562. Under the majority's strict definition of public policy, this employee will no longer have redress. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 684.
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support a co-worker's sexual harassment claim. However, the
court should have applied a broader definition of tortious discharge in contravention of public policy in order to allow redress
for many situations not addressed under a statute or constitutional provision.
Other state courts have defined additional sources of public
policy. According to the New Jersey Supreme Court, public policy includes: legislation, administrative rules, regulations or decisions, judicial decisions, and a professional code of ethics. 1I3 The
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the judiciary is to decide
on a case by case basis and balance the interests of the employee, the employer, and the public.1!4 This broad definition of
public policy allows the court to define the cause of action as
necessary to protect the interests involved.
Under California's narrow definition of public policy limiting its sources to statutes and the constitution, some employees
may be without redress. Such an exclusion may include a coworker who is constructively discharged for supporting a coworker's sexual harassment claim when the Department of Fair
Employment and Housing is not conducting an investigation.
In Gantt, the California Supreme Court finally defined the
scope of the public policy exception to at-will employment. 1I1I Although too narrow to encourage employees without specific constitutional or statutory authority to demand redress for possible
wrongful discharge, the holding in Gantt allows some employees
53. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980). Not everything
is considered a source of public policy by the New Jersey Supreme Court. For example,
the New Jersey Supreme Court points to the Hippocratic oath as an insufficient source
of public policy. [d. at 514. The doctor, an employee at will did not have a cause of
action against her employer to recover for damages for the termination of her employment following her refusal to continue a project she viewed as medically unethical. [d. at
508. The dissent points to a medical code of ethics that should have been used as a
source of public policy. [d. at 514.
54. [d. at 512. Employees have an interest in not being discharged for exercising
their legal rights. [d. at 511. Employers have an interest in running their businesses as
they see fit. The public has an interest in employment stability.
55. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 687.
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to support a co-worker's sexual harassment claim without fear of
discharge.

Alexandra D'Italia*

• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1994.
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TORT LAW
The mother and brother of a man who shot and killed his wife
are not negligent for failing to protect 'or warn her.
Hansra v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216 (1992). In Hansra
v. Superior Court,I the California Court of Appeal held that a
husband's mother and brother were under no duty to control
him or to protect his wife whom he shot and killed. The court
concluded that the husband's murder of his wife was not reasonably foreseeable and therefore refused to impose a legal duty of
care upon defendants. 2

FACTS
On April 12, 1989, Joginder Hansra killed his wife, Juanita,
and then killed himself.s Juanita had previously told Joginder
that she planned to terminate the marriage. Joginder reacted
with anxiety, depression, and hostility towards her, all of which
he expressed to defendants.· Joginder also told defendants that
he would prevent Juanita's departure by any means at his
disposal. lI
Joginder Hansra had a history of mental and emotional instability and was undergoing mental health treatment until the
time of the murder.6 He had previously been disciplined at work
for threatening fellow employees with physical violence. 7 Furthermore, police officers had on earlier occasions removed weapons from Joginder's custody and control.
Plaintiffs8 first argued that defendants should be held liable
1. Hansra v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 216 (1992).

2. Id. at 226.
3: Id. at 218.

4. Id. at 219.
5.Id.
6.Id.
7.Id.
8. The plaintiffs were Juanita Hansra's children and a representative of Ms.
Hansra's estate.
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on a theory of general negligence, since their conduct created an
unreasonable risk of harm to the defendant. 9 Relying on Pamela
L. v. Farmer, lO plaintiffs distinguished nonfeasance from misfeasance, arguing that the defendants were actively involved in cre~
ating and maintaining Joginder's animosity towards Juanita
which foresee ably increased the risk of harm to her.II In support
of this contention, the plaintiffs pointed to several acts of the
defendants: Joginder's mother and brother convinced him to
divest himself of his interest in the family orchard operation
prior to marriage; they persuaded Joginder to condition visitation between Juanita's children and their father upon payment
of child support; and they spoke derogatorily of Juanita to
Joginder.I2
As a second theory, plaintiffs argued there was a "special
relationship" between 1) Juanita and defendants and 2)
Joginder and defendants, giving rise to a duty to protect her
from Joginder's violent outbursts. I3 Plaintiffs proposed that
these relationships gave rise to a duty of care independent of the
duty existing by reason of defendants' conduct.14
Defendants answered plaintiffs' complaint by asserting that
plaintiffs had no viable claim. III Thereafter, defendants moved
for summary judgment. IS The trial court denied the motion,
stating that defendants had failed to controvert the allegations
in plaintiffs' complaint.n Defendants petitioned the Court of
Appeal for a writ of mandate compelling the trial court to grant
their motion. IS Defendants contended that an appeal from a fi9. [d. at 221.
10. Pamela L. v. Farmer, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1980). In Pamela L. the court found a
woman negligent for inviting teenage girls to her home when she knew her husband had
molested women and children in the past. The court held that while a person generally
has no duty to control the conduct of another or to warn those endangered by such
conduct, this will not apply where the defendant's conduct has made the plaintiff's position worse, thereby creating a foreseeable risk of harm to the third person. In such cases,
the standard of ordinary care will apply.
11. Hansra, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 222.
12. [d. at 219.
13. [d. at 224.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

[d.
[d. at 219.
[d.
Id. at 220.
[d.
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nal judgment would be an insufficient remedy since plaintiffs'
inability to state a cognizable claim would result in a needless
trial. 19

COURT'S ANALYSIS
I.

PROCEDURE

Pursuant to the California Code of Civil Procedure section
1086, the court examined whether an appeal from the judgment
would be an adequate remedy for defendants. 2o The court found
that plaintiffs had no cognizable claim and therefore agreed with
defendants that a preemptory writ ordering the court to dismiss
the case was a necessary remedy to avoid a needless and wasteful trial,21 Accordingly, the court treated defendants' motion as
one for judgment on the pleadings and issued a preemptory writ
of mandate directing the trial court to grant the motion for summary judgment. 22 '

II. GENERAL NEGLIGENCE
In determining whether to impose a duty of care, the Hansra court first set out the factors to consider as established by
Rowland v. Christian. 23 These factors are the following:
(1) foreseeability of harm,
(2) degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury,
(3) closeness of connection between defendant's
conduct and injury suffered,
(4) moral blame attached to defendant's conduct,
(5) the policy of preventing future harm,
(6) the extent of the burden to the defendant and
consequences to the community for imposing liability, and
(7) the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
CAL. CIY. CODE § 1086 (West 1980).
Hansra, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 220.
Id. at 218.
Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
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Ultimately the Hansra court concluded that the single most important factor, foreseeability of the harm, was not present and
thus foreclosed liability.24 The court found plaintiffs' 'reliance on
Pamela L. misplaced and defendants' reliance on Wise v. Superior Court 2G -more applicable. The court noted that defendants'
conduct did not create a foreseeable risk of harm to the plaintiffs unlike the defendants' conduct in Pamela L. Rather, the
court pointed out that defendants' derogation of Juanita would
foreseeably result in dissolution of marriage, not murder.26

III.

NEGLIGENCE
RELATIONSHIP"

BASED

ON

"SPECIAL

As support for their second theory, plaintiffs reli~d on
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California which established that an affirmative duty to warn could arise from the existence of a "special relationship."27
Plaintiffs proposed two sets of "special relationships." The
first relationship was based on the familial ties between Joginder
and the defendants which according to plaintiffs established a
duty to control Joginder. Th'e second relationship was between
the defendants and Juanita through her marriage to Joginder.
Plaintiffs claimed this relationship created a duty to warn
Juanita of Joginder's violent intentions. 28 The court rejected
both arguments stating that no facts suggested that defendants
actually had an ability to control Joginder.29 Furthermore, the
court pointed out that merely alleging a "special relationship"
did not create liability absent foreseeability of harm.30 In fact,
24. Hansra, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 224.
25. Wise v. Superior Court, 274 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1990). In Wise, the court refused to
impose liability on the wife of a sniper who shot the plaintiff. The court found that the
wife took no action which made the victim's position worse or created a foreseeable risk
of harm. Specifically, the wife did not assist her husband in any way nor could she foresee this type of harm (sniper attack) to an identifiable victim (passing motorist).
26. Hansra, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 224.
27. Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal 1976). In
Tarasoff, the court held that the "special relationship" between therapist and client supported imposing an affirmative duty on the therapist to protect third parties foreseeably
harmed by the client.
28. Hansra, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 226.
29. [d.
30. [d.
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the same factors used to establish a duty of care 31 were necessary to establish a "special relationship."32 Ultimately, the court
found that the "special relationship" theory was indistinguishable from the general negligence theory, since a lack of foreseeability was fatal to both of these claims. 33
CRITIQUE
After determining that the same policy considerations from
Rowland 34 underlie both claims, the court applied its conclusions from the general negligence claim to the "special relationship" theory. However, without a separate discussion of the second claim, the court's holding is based on an incomplete
analysis. Although the same factors from Rowland are applied to
each claim, separate inquiries arise. For the general negligence
claim, the relevant issue is whether defendants' conduct of denigrating Juanita created a foreseeable risk of physical harm to
her. However, for the claim based on a "special relationship",
the relevant issue is whether, based on defendants' knowledge of
Joginder's violent propensities, their failure"to warn Juanita created a foreseeable risk of harm to her. Ultimately the court focused its causation analysis mainly on defendants' active conduct and therefore only gave passing consideration to the
remaining Rowland factors.
A full analysis of the essential policy considerations set
forth in Rowland will reveal that the decision not to impose liability under the "special relationship" theory was more likely
based on a compilation of all factors rather than foreseeability
alone. These essential factors include: 1) foreseeability of harm
to plaintiff and closeness of connection between defendants' conduct and the injury suffered; 2) the moral blame attached to defendants' conduct; and 3) the policy of preventing future harm
and the extent of the burden to defendant as well as the consequences to the community of imposing a duty of care. 311
31. See supra note 23.
32. Hansra, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 227.
33.Id.
34. See supra note 23.
35. Two factors, degree of certainty that plaintiff suffered injury and the cost and
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved are not discussed here as neither warrants
considerable analysis. Certain factors have been combined because they fall under the
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With reference to foreseeability, the court aptly concluded
that defendants' conduct of derogating Juanita would
foreseeably result in dissolution of marriage, not murder. The
court then briefly considered defendants' failure to warn, and
with reference to defendants' knowledge stated, "the allegations
also fail to suggest that Joginder's hostility was ever directed at
Juanita, who was the object of his desire."36 Therefore, because
no evidence existed that Joginder had previously harmed
Juanita, the court concluded defendants could not foresee
Joginder's actions. However, given his history of violence combined with his recent threats, which he expressed to defendants,
to prevent Juanita's departure by any means, the court's conclusion is almost disingenuous. In fact, the court's statement also
suggests that because Juanita was the object of Joginder's affections, she would be an unlikely target of his violence. Given that
thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed by their
male partners; this conclusion is flawed. 37 However, perhaps
Juanita herself knew about Joginder's propensity for violence,
and thus the court considered her sufficiently forewarned.
It is also possible that the court's expectations are different
for family members and "lay people" than professional counselors. Arguably the professional is better qualified to predict future violence. 38 Such reasoning may help to explain why the
claim against Joginder's family was dismissed yet the claim
against the mental health workers still remains.

Upon application of the second factor, moral blame attached to defendants' conduct, the court stated," [T]he allegations of the complaint, if true, would justify moral blame for defendants' treatment of both decedents. Fundamental policy
promotes marriage and the sanctity of the marital relationship.
same broader heading, i.e. "causation."
36. Hansra, 9 Cal. ·Rptr. 2d at 223.
37. Domestic Violence: Terrorism in the Home, Hearing before the Subcommittee
on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1990).
38. See Robert L. Rabin, Tort Law in Transition: Tracing the Patterns of Sociolegal Change, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. I (1988). Professor Rabin suggests that extension of the
affirmative duty principle is based on the notion that the "activity provider" is better
positioned to act as an accident preventer or "risk spreader." But see, Tarasoff, supra
note 27, in which the American Psychiatric Association asserted, based on research, that
therapists' forecasts of violence are more often wrong than right.
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However, because of the lack of a close connection between defendants' conduct and Joginder's lethal attack ... this factor
weighs only marginally in plaintiffs' favor."39 (emphasis added).
The court thus concluded that defendants' active conduct of
derogating Juanita was morally reprehensible in that it could
lead to marital discord. However, the court never examined the
moral blame attached to defendants' lack of conduct (failure to
warn) in light of their knowledge about Joginder. If both claims
were analyzed under the Rowland factors then it is this lack of
conduct which is the relevant issue for the "special relationship"
claim. Understanding this, the foreseeable outcome of defendants' failure to warn would be quite different. Defendants' failure to warn Juanita would not encourage "marital discord";
rather, it would allow Joginder's violence, uninterrupted, to
bring physical harm, or even death, to his wife.
An unconditional policy favoring marital sanctity creates a
tension between the court's analysis of both claims. In the case
of defendants' active derogation of Juanita, the court condemned defendants' interference for promoting marital discord
which might lead to divorce. Conversely, in evaluating defendants' failure to warn, it is precisely their lack of interference
which is deserving of moral blame. This raises the issue of when
family privacy should be "sacrificed" in the name of public policy. The court did not address this question, but instead let
stand an analysis which promotes a traditional patriarchal family structure where women may be victimized without outside
intervention. 40 A full analysis of both claims would have provided greater insight into the underlying values motivating the
decision.
The court next examined the policy of preventing future
harm and the extent to which defendants would be burdened by
the imposition of liability, and determined that the burden of
notifying the potential victim was slight. However, the court also
39. Hansra, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 224.
40. While to some readers these observations' may appear far-reaching, the court's
unqualified support for marital sanctity, in the case of spousal murder, is suspect. This is
particularly notable given that in the past when courts were reluctant to punish husbands for spousal abuse, justices based their decisions on the desire to maintain the
"unity of spouses." For a thorough discussion on this topic, see, R. EMERSON DOBASH.
VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES (1979).
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concluded that the consequences to the community of imposing
liability were high when compared to the benefits, which the
court dismissed as speculative.
If Juanita's death was found to be the foreseeable result of
defendants' inaction, then a finding of liability would be a powerful incentive for those aware of the danger to communicate
their knowledge to potential victims. A simple warning, given by
those most likely to witness the danger signals, would be an easy
way to avoid liability and result in a tremendous benefit to the
community at large. On the other hand, the court's determination that this is a heavy burden may reflect the belief that placing liability on family members for not protecting each other is
inappropriate. Family members are not detached professionals
but rather invested members of an intimate structure resulting
in psychological and emotional barriers. Barriers such as denial,
for example, could prevent their clear, unhindered foresight. 4 }

Given the prevalence of spousal violence, a more thorough
analysis of these issues is imperative to guide future courts in
their decisions.
'
CONCLUSION
The outcome of this case is consistent with the judicial system's reluctance to impose liability on a third party for the
criminal conduct of another. 42 However, in deciding whether to
impose a duty of care, the court relied on an oversimplified analysis of foreseeability and neglected other policy considerations.
If the court applied the Rowland factors to both claims, it
should have adapted them to the relevant inquiries for each
claim rather than merely transferring the conclusions from one
41. One example is Pamela L. v. Farmer, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1980), which raised this
issue by placing liability on the wife of a sexual molestor. The profound denial existing
in families where one member is a sexual perpetrator raises serious doubts as to any
deterrence value a lawsuit could have. See, Phillip Madonna, Susan Van Scoyk & David
P.H. Jones, Family Interactions Within Incest and Non-Incest Families, 5 AMER. J. OF
FAM. LAW 251 (1991) which found that "a striking finding was the extent of distortion
and incongruence in the belief systems of incest families."
42. Note, Affirmatiue Duty After Tarasoff, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1013 (1983). The
author suggests that, despite contrary expectations, California courts have not deviated
from the spirit of the common law practice. Rather, courts remain rell)ctant to extend
the concept of affirmative duty.
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claim to the other. In its streamlined analysis, the court obscured the complex value judgments underlying the decision.
Asha Khosla*

* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1994.
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CRIMINAL LAW
Evidence of a defendant's cultural background is relevant in
determining the presence or absence of the mental states of a
crime.
People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1991). In People v. Wu,
the California Court of Appeal held the trial court committed
prejudicial error in refusing to issue jury instructions relating to
the defense of unconsciousness;l and ruled that the defendant
was entitled to have jury instructions on the effect defendant's
cultural background 2 had on her state of mind at the time she
killed her son. 3

FACTS
I.

BACKGROUND

Defendant, Helen Wu,' was born in Saigon, China in 1943.1)
At age nineteen, Helen moved to Macau, got married and had a
daughter. 6 In 1963, Helen met Gary Wu, the son of one of her
friends. 7 Shortly thereafter, Gary moved to the United States
and was married. 8 Helen remained in Macau and was divorced
after eight years of marriage. s In the mid-1970's, Helen was
again engaged to be married, but her fiance died. 1o
In 1978 or 1979, Gary contacted Helen because he heard she
was divorced and had a child. 11 Gary was not happy with his
1. Hereinafter referred to as the unconsciousness defense.
2. Hereinafter referred to as the cultural background defense.
3. People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868, 887 (1991).
4. Also known as Helen Hamg Ieng Chau.
5. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
6.Id.
7.Id.
8.Id.
9.Id.
10. Helen's fiance's sister, Nancy Chung, became Helen's close friend. Helen's fiance
made Nancy promise to help Helen because she was a kind, moral person, who was not
greedy, but too trusting of others. Id.
11. Id.
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marriage because his wife could not have children, and they discussed the possibility of Helen coming to the United States to
bear his child. 12
Gary gave Helen $20,000 to apply for a visa and in November, 1979, Helen came to the United States. 1S Gary assured
Helen that once his divorce was final, he would definitely marry
her. 14
.
By January, 1980, Gary was divorced, but he did not tell
Helen. 111 Helen became pregnant by Gary in early 1980 and
moved to her own apartment, where Gary would visit her.16
Their son, Sidney, was born in November, 1980, but Gary still
had not proposed marriage,u Helen became depressed about her
situation, especially because she could not speak English, could
not drive and had no support system in the United States. 18
Helen told Gary she intended to move back to Macau. 19
Finally, in 1981, Helen returned to Macau. 2o She left Sidney
with Gary because Sidney was born out of wedlock and, in
China, she and Sidney would be shamed and humiliated. 21
For the next six years, Helen regularly asked Gary to bring
Sidney to visit her.22 In September, 1987, Gary needed money
and Helen told him she would loan him the money if he brought
Sidney to visit her.2s Helen did not have the money to loan
Gary, so she borrowed $100,000 in cash and a receipt for a certificate of deposit for a million Hong Kong dollars.24 In January
12. Helen was in love with Gary and believed he would marry her after he divorced
his wife. [d.
13. When Helen arrived, Gary hugged and kissed her. [d.
14. After Helen's arrival in the United States, she lived with Gary's mother. [d. at
870-71.
15. [d. at 871.
16. [d.

17. [d.
18. [d.

19. Helen expected Gary to try to persuade her to stay, but he did not do so. [d.
20. [d.

21. In Chinese culture, children born out of wedlock are frowned upon. Therefore,
the only person in China who knew about Sidney was Nancy. [d.
22. In 1984, Gary asked Helen to visit the United States, but she refused. She felt
that she and Sidney would not have dignity or status unless she were married. [d.
23. [d.
24. [d.
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1988, Gary took Sidney to visit Helen. 211 Helen showed the cash
and receipt to Gary and he proposed marriage. 26 She refused because she felt the proposal was only because of her money.27 Additionally, she did not know if Gary was still married. 28
In August 1989, Helen came to the United States and visited Gary's mother, who was terminally ill. 29 Gary's mother, who
took care of Sidney, told Helen that when she died, Helen
should take Sidney because Gary would not take good care of
him.30 Gary's cousin Sandy gave Helen similar advice. 3}
At the end of August, Gary told Helen they were going to be
married. 32 On September 1, 1989, they were married. 33 Helen
still thought Gary had married her for her money and expressed
her doubts to Gary.3ol When Helen asked whether the marriage
was worthwhile simply to legitimize Sidney, Gary replied that
many people could give him children. 311 Helen told Gary he
would be sorry.36 She then decided to return to Macau. 37
II. THE INCIDENT
On September 9, 1989, Helen and eight-year old Sidney
were talking when Sidney told her that Gary called Helen
"psychotic" and "very troublesome."38 Sidney told Helen about
Gary's girlfriend, Rosemary, and said that Gary loved Rosemary
more than him.39
25. [d.
26. [d.
27. [d.

28. This situation depressed Helen, and she attempted to throw herself out of a
window of an apartment, but Nancy stopped her. [d.
29. [d.
30. [d. at 871-72.
31. [d. at 872.
32. [d.
33. [d.
34. When Helen asked him about this, Gary told her she had no right to speak until
she produced the money. [d.
35. [d.
36. [d. Helen later explained this comment meant that she was going to Macau and
kill herself. [d.
37. When Helen told Gary she was leaving, he asked if she was going to get the
money for him. [d.
38. [d.

39. Sidney told Helen that Gary made Sidney get up early so Gary could take Rose-
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Helen thought about what Sidney's grandmother and cousin
told her about Gary's care for Sidney.40 She began having heart
palpitations and breathing difficulties, at which time Helen told
Sidney she wanted to die and asked him if he would go with her
to the other life. 41
Helen left the bedroom, cut a piece of rope, went back into
the bedroom and strangled Sidney:u She left a note for Gary
and tried to strangle herself, but when that failed, she went to
the kitchen, slashed her wrist with a knife, went back to the
bedroom and lay down with Sidney.43 Gary came home and
found Helen and Sidney.44
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Helen Wu was convicted of second degree murder. 4Ci Her
motion for a new trial was denied and she was sentenced to a
prison term of fifteen years to life. 46 She appealed contending
reversible error for the refusal to issue two jury instructions on:
(1) unconsciousness defense," and (2) cultural background
mary's daughters to school in the morning and, if Sidney did not get up, Gary would
scold and beat him. Also, earlier in the day, Helen intervened when Gary hit Sidney
because he would not get out of the car. [d.
40. [d.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Sidney did not answer, but clung to Helen's neck and cried. [d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 869.
[d.
Helen's proposed jury instructions on unconsciousness stated:
A person who commits what would otherwise be a criminal act, while unconscious, is not guilty of a crime.
This rule of law applies to persons who are not conscious
of acting but who perform acts while asleep or while suffering
from a delirium of fever, or because of an attack of [psychomotor) epilepsy, a blow to the head, the involuntary taking of
drugs or the involuntary consumption of intoxicating liquor, or
any similar cause.
Unconsciousness does not require that a person be incapable of movement.
Evidence has been received which may tend to show that
the defendant was unconscious at the time and place of the
commission of the alleged crime for which [she) is here on
trial. If, after a consideration of all the evidence, you have reasonable doubt that the defendant was conscious at the time
the alleged crime was committed, [she) must be found not
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defense. 4s

COURT'S ANALYSIS
I. UNCONSCIOUSNESS DEFENSE

The court first discussed the unconsciousness defense 49 and
its application to the facts of the case. After examining the testimony of several witnesses, the court determined there was
enough evidence to warrant the unconsciousness instruction. 50
The court found that the trial court committed reversible error
in refusing to issue the unconsciousness instruction. III

II.

CULTURAL BACKGROUND DEFENSE

A.

PROSECUTION'S ARGUMENTS

The court began by addressing the prosecution's five arguments against the cultural background defense. 1i2 First, the court
dismissed two of the prosecution arguments that "evidence that
defendant had values and motives of a traditional Chinese
mother was contradicted by the evidence,"1i3 and "the prosecution's expert noted that nothing in Chinese culture or religion
encouraged filicide."1i4 The court noted than an appropriate instruction can still be given even when there is a conflict in
evidence.1i1i
guilty.
No. 4.30.) Id. at 873.
48. Helen's proposed jury instruction on the cultural defense stated:
You have received evidence of defendant's cultural background and the relationship of her culture to her mental state.
You may, but are not required to, consider that the [sic) evidence in determining the presence or absence of the essential
mental states of the crimes defined in these instructions, or in
determining any other issue in this case.
Id. at 879-80.
49. If a person is not conscious of acting during the commission of a crime, he or she
may raise the unconsciousness defense.
50. Id. at 874.
51. Id. at 879.
52. The cultural background defense, as used herein, may be raised when a criminal
defendant's cultural background may be considered to determine his or her mental state
or any other issue in the case.
53. Id. at 880.
54.Id.
55.Id.
(CALJIC
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Next, the prosecution argued that the instruction directed
the jury's attention to particular testimony, which is prohibited.lis The court also dismissed this argument, noting that the
jury's attention is directed to conflicting evidence which related
to the prosecution's theory of revenge and Helen's theory of the
impact of her cultural background had· on her state of mind.1i7
The prosecution then argued that "[n]either an awareness
of the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating society nor acting despite such awareness is included within
the definition of malice required for murder."118 This argument
also failed, inasmuch as Helen did not argue that she was unaware of the laws controlling society or that she acted with or
without regard for these laws.1i9
Lastly, the prosecution opposed the specific cultural background defense by arguing there already were sufficient instructions given to cover that defense. so They listed various jury instructions relating to murder, manslaughter, heat of passion, and
involuntary manslaughter. s1 The court stated that none of the
instructions tell the jury that evidence of defendant's cultural
background may be considered in relation to her murder
charge. s2
None of the prosecution's arguments were sufficient to show
that the trial court properly refused to give the cultural background instruction. 6s However, both the prosecution and trial
court apparently believed they should not give the instruction
because there was no appellate law on this subject. s•
56.Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. [d.
61. Id.
62.Id.
63. Id.
64.Id.

at
at
at
at
at

881.
880.
881.
880.
881.

at 882.
The California Supreme Court held that California courts
"have often approved instructions pointing out the relevance
of certain kinds of evidence to 'a specific issue [citation)," and
that lack of motive, lack of furtiveness, and the defendant's
relationship with his victims were all relevant on the issue of
premeditation and deliberation, and that "no reason appears
why a defendant upon request should not be entitled to a spe-
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CULTURAL BACKGROUND JURY INSTRUCTION AS A CORRECT
STATEMENT OF THE LAW

Next, the court considered whether the instruction on cultural background should have been refused for reasons other
than those raised by the prosecution. The court turned to the
issue of whether the jury could properly consider evidence of
Helen's cultural background in determining the presence or absence of the "essential mental states of the crimes defined in
these instructions, or in determining any other issue in this
case."611
The court found that evidence of Helen's cultural background was relevant to the issues of premeditation and deliberation. 66 At trial, the prosecution presented evidence of statements
Helen made days before the killing,67 and argued that they
showed she planned to kill Sidney and take revenge on Gary.68
The defense argued that Helen's cultural background offered another explanation for her statements as well as a motive for the
killing.s9
The court also determined that evidence of Helen's cultural
background was relevant to the issue of malice aforethought and
the heat of passion defense. 7o Heat of passion can be brought on
cific instruction pointing out that" such circumstances might
be considered by the jury on the issues of premeditation and
deliberation.
[d. at 882 citing People v. Sears, 465 P.2d 847, 853-54 (Cal. 1970).
65. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 882-83. The mental states at issue were (l) premeditation
and deliberation, (2) malice aforethought, and (3) specific intent to kill.
66. [d. at 883.
67. For example, Helen told Gary "he would be sorry." Id. at 872.
68. Id. at 883.
69. When Helen told Gary he would be sorry, she meant she was thinking about
returning to Macau and killing herself because of the strong disapproval of having a
child out of wedlock. As for motive, the killing occurred immediately after Helen learned
that Sidney was not loved by Gary and was treated badly. Helen's motive was to protect
Sidney from ill-treatment in the future by caring for him in the afterlife. [d.
70. [d. A defendant must be under the influence of a strong passion which would
render an ordinary person to act rashly and without deliberation, and to act from passion rather than judgment. People v. Valentine, 169 P.2d I, 11 (Cal. 1946). A person need
not act in rage or anger, but any violent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion
would qualify. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 884 citing People v. Borchers, 325 P.2d 97, 102 (Cal.
1958).
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. There are
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by a series of events over a considerable period of time 71 which
cause a person to be under the influence of "pre-existing
stress. "72
In her relationship with Gary, Helen experienced a series of
events over a ten year period which caused her great anxiety and
stress. 73 Her cultural background could explain the source of the
stress and how Sidney's statements to her immediately preceding the killing could have constituted sufficient provocation to
kill her son in the heat of passion. 74 This evidence was relevant
in determining Helen's mental and emotional state at the time
of the killing.
.
Dr. Chien explained the Chinese belief in the afterlife, and
testified that Helen thought she could do nothing but bring Sidney with her to the other life after death. 75 Because of the strong
cultural expectation that a mother care for her child, Dr. Chien
also testified that Helen thought she was doing this out of a
mother's love and responsibility for her child. 76
Dr. Gock testified that Helen's response to her situation was
culturally determined. 77 When she learned that Gary was neither
three kinds: (a) Voluntary - upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. (b) Involuntary
- . . . . (c) Vehicular - . . . . CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1988).
71. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 884 citing Borchers, 325 P.2d at 102.
72. The effect of "a series of events over a period of time" may be that the defendant, just before the provoking incident, is under "pre-existing stress." Wu at 884 n.4
citing People v. Pacheco, 172 Cal. Rptr. 269, 274 (1981).
73. Wu at 884.
74. The court relied on Dr. Chien and Dr. Gock's testimony to explain the source of
the stress. [d. at 884-86.
75. Id. at 885. By this time, Helen had decided that she was going to commit suicide. She felt that Sidney was unwanted by his father and was being mistreated because
he was born out of wedlock. This realization, together with the fact that his grandmother
would not be able to care for him in the future, caused Helen to feel trapped, so she
thought she should take him to heaven with her. [d.
76. According to Dr. Chien,
Helen had an extreme guilt feeling because her son was unwanted, she couldn't fulfill her duties to her son and was worried about what would happen to him. In Asian culture, if the
mother commits suicide and leaves her child alone, it is considered totally irresponsible behavior, especially because no
one could provide real love like a mother.
[d.

77. "It is very difficult to divorce ourselves from our culture and act in a totally
culturally different way. And so, you know, she in many ways is a product of her past
experiences, including her culture." [d. at 886.
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taking care of Sidney nor providing paternal love, the only option she felt was available to her was to kill herself and take her
son with her to the other world, where she could devote herself
to taking care of Sidney.78
The court concluded that the cultural background instruction was proper in this case and found that upon retrial, Helen
would be entitled to have the instruction given to the jury.79 The
court reversed the judgment because the trial court failed to give
the unconsciousness instruction and therefore did not decide if
Helen was prejudiced by the failure to give the cultural background instruction. 80
CRITIQUE

Wu appears to be one of the first cases where cultural background was raised as a legitimate defense to a criminal charge.
Although it has been raised in other cases, it has not always
been successful. 81
The cultural background defense was raised in a California
Superior Court case entitled People v. Croy.82 Patrick "Hooty"
Croy, a Karuk-Shasta Indian, was convicted of murdering a police officer and was acquitted after raising the defense. 83
78. Dr. Gock emphasized that Helen's purpose was benevolent, even though it may
sound implausible to those raised in another culture. Helen did not see it as a killing, but
rather that through death they could be reunited and she could provide the care for her
son that he was not getting in this world. Id.
79. Id. at 887.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., People of New York v. Aphaylath, 502 N.E.2d 998, (N.Y. 1986). In
Aphaylath, a Laotian refugee, in a jealous rage, repeatedly stabbed his wife after she
received a phone call from a former boyfriend. Testimony regarding Laotian culture was
excluded because the witness had not evaluated the defendant. Bui v. State, 551 So. 2d
1094 (Ala. 1988). In Bui, a Vietnamese refugee separated from his wife, suspected she
was seeing other men. He killed his three children because he did not want his wife to
"get them." A cross-cultural counselor was not permitted to testify concerning defendant's medical condition because he was not qualified to judge the defendant's sanity.
82. People v. Croy, No. 131832 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 1, 1990).
83. Croy, his sister Norma Jean and cousin Darrell Jones were being chased by
Yreka police officers, Siskiyou County sheriffs and California Highway Patrol officers.
They fled to their grandmother's cabin in the hills, chased by the authorities. Norma
Jean and Darrell were shot at the cabin in which Croy's grandmother was living. When
Croy neared the cabin, Bo Hittson, a Yreka lawman, surprised him from behind. Hittson
shot twice and Croy fired one fatal shot. A jury convicted Croy of first-degree murder
and he was sentenced to death. However, upon retrial, Croy raised a cultural defense,
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The Wu and Croy cases recognize the diversity of nationalities, varied experiences and cultural backgrounds of the people
in California. By allowing a cultural background defense, the
courts have recognized that not just one set of values exists upon
which every person's actions must be judged. The impact of this
defense on the criminal justice system in California could be farreaching because of the diversity of the population.
However, the Wu case did not clearly define the standards
by which a cultural background defense could be raised. Therefore, the application of the defense presents some interesting issues and questions. Perhaps the most difficult and controversial
issue is. what constitutes a "valid" defense? Should it be a defense to infanticide of an infant girl when the defendant is part
of a culture that promotes males over females? Should it be a
defense to violence against a woman when the defendant is part
of a culture that condones such violence?
The courts may find it difficult to determine what a valid
defense is because inevitably it would inject another value system into the particular crime. This may defeat the purpose of
the cultural background defense. At the same time, it is necessary to draw a line somewhere to avoid using culture as a justification for committing a crime.
Another issue this defense raises is to whom does the defense apply? In the Wu case, Helen came from a culture which
stigmatizes children born out of wedlock. In the United States
however, children born out of wedlock are not treated in the
same manner as they are in China. The defense apparently applies' to racial minorities, but can it apply to everyone? Culture
is a part of each of our lives and it could be argued that the set
of "American values" generally promoted in society is that of
the dominant population. Although changing, many of the institutions in American society are controlled by the majority white
population. As a result, these dominant values become inherent
within our society. The cultural defense recognizes that there
can no longer be only one set of dominant values. Therefore, this
arguing he did not feel that he could surrender to the police, based on the history of
relations with the white settlers and the genocide of 95% of the Native Americans in the
area. As a result, Croy was acquitted. David Talbot, The Ballad of Hooty Croy. LA
TIMES. June 24, 1990, (Magazine) at 16, 18.
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cultural defense should only apply to racial or ethnic minorities,
whose cultures promote different values.
Another issue raised 'is the difference between immigrant
and American-born populations, even within the same ethnicity.
In the Wu case and in the other cases where the defense has
been unsuccessfully raised, the defendants were immigrants and
their beliefs came directly from another culture. But would the
defense apply to third or fourth generations born in the United
States or would the court determine that "assimilation" into
western culture had occurred? It is impossible to make a "blanket" determination one way or another. Instead, this issue
should be left to the trier of fact to determine the cultural impact on the individual defendant by relying on the facts of the
case, the· characteristics of the individual's particular cultural
background and how these characteristics manifest themselves
in his or her life.
A related issue is the difference between ethnicity and culture. What about the situation where a child is adopted at birth
by parents of another nationality? What would the culture of
that child be? An individual does not inherently possess certain
cultural characteristics. Rather, an individual learns cultural values from the family and the community in which he or she is
raised. The determination of how culture impacts an individual's
life should again be left to the trier of fact as discussed above.
A final issue raised is the concept of belief in the afterlife.
Potentially, this could expand the defense for any person who
believes in the afterlife. However, the Wu case does not address
this belief as a religious belief in and of itself, but only within
the .context of Helen Wu's cultural background and beliefs.
Therefore, the defense appears to be limited to the connections
between a cultural background and belief in the afterlife, and
not a general religious belief.
CONCLUSION

a

The Wu decision may have very positive impact on criminal law defense. The cultural background defense is especially
significant in California given that racial minorities constitute
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over forty-three percent of the population. 84 Further, over seventy percent of those incarcerated in the California state prison
system are minorities. 811 Although it is not clear how many of
these prisoners could have utilized the cultural background defense, it is likely that the use of the' defense could have caused
their cases to turn out much differently. The cultural background defense should lend to a more equitable system of
justice.
Donna L. Kotake*

84. The racial composition of the total population in California is: 57.12% white and
other race; 7.4% Black; .08% American Indian, Eskimo or Aleut; 9.6% Asian or Pacific
Islander and 25.8% Hispanic origin. 1990 Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Table 1: Selected
Population and Housing Characteristics, California.
85. The prison system in California has the following racial composition: 29.1%
White, 33.8% Black, 32.2% Hispanic and 4.9% Other. CDC Facts, CAL. DEP'T. CORR.,
August 1, 1992 at 1.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1994.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss3/10

40

et al.: California Law Survey

CRIMINAL LAW
A human fetus that is injured while in the womb cannot be the
victim of manslaughter unless it dies after being born alive by
exhibiting some sign of (1) circulation or respiration, and (2)
brain activity, during or after its birth, rather than dying while
still in the womb.
People v.. Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120 (Ct. App. 1992). Scott
Flores was under the influence of alcohol when he drove his car
over a center divider of a freeway and collided with a car driven
by Sylvia Bacon who was eight and one-half months pregnant. l
She was taken to a hospital where an emergency Caesarian section was performed. 2 Although the fetus 3 had a slow, faint heartbeat lasting a few minutes, it never began breathing.' Mr. Flores
was charged with gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated
in the death of the fetus.~ The trial court dismissed the charge
because of insufficient evidence that the fetus was a "human being" within the meaning of the manslaughter statute. 6 The prosecution appealed: 7
The California Court of Appeal for the S'econd District affirmed. 8 The appellate court followed the common law "born
alive" rule which defines "human being" as that term is used in
homicide statutes to mean a person who has been born alive. S
The court held that under Health and Safety Code section
7180(a), a fetus is born alive if it exhibits some sign of (1) circu1. People v. Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120, 120-21 (Ct. App. 1992).
2. Id. at 121.
3. The court refers to the product of Ms. Bacon's pregnancy as a "fetus/infant" because, "[s)ince the question of whether this was a fetus or a living infant is the ultimate
issue to be decided on appeal, it is appropriate to use both terms in the disjunctive until
that issue is resolved." Id. at 121 n.1. This Case Note uses the term "fetus" merely for
simplicity; as used herein, "fetus" refers to any human child from conception through
birth.
4. Id. at 121.
5. Id. at 122.
6. Id. at 122.
7. Id. at 120.
8. Id. at 126.
9. Id. at 122.

1081
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lation or respiration, and (2) brain activity, during or after its
birth, and since Ms. Bacon's fetus showed no sign of brain activity, it was not born alive and therefore was not a "human being"
within the meaning of the manslaughter statute. 10
FACTS
At approximately 7 p.m. on January 2S, 1990, Scott Eric
Flores, the defendant, was driving his car on the Long Beach
Freeway at an estimated speed of 75 to SO miles per hour. l l He
failed to navigate a curve,12 swerved as he overcorrected in
rounding the curve, and ultimately crossed the center divider
into oncoming traffic, colliding head-on with a car driven by
Sylvia Bacon. 13 After the accident, a police officer noticed that
the defendant was exhibiting signs of intoxication and directed a
nurse to withdraw a blood sample from the defendant at approximately 9 p.m. which, when later analyzed, showed that the defendant had a blood-alcohol level of .lS.14
At the time of the accident, Ms. Bacon was approximately
eight and one-half months pregnant. 1& She suffered a nose bleed,
cuts and bruises to her arms and hip, and, immediately after the
acciden~, an abdominal contraction and nauseation. I6
Ms. Bacon was taken to a hospital where a female fetus was
delivered by an emergency Caesarian section at approximately
10 p.m. I7 Although the fetus was pale, in shock and not breathing or moving, a very faint, slow heartbeat of less than twenty
beats per minute was detected several minutes after its delivery.lS The doctor attempted to resuscitate the fetus by forcing
10. [d. at 125-26.

11. [d. at 120-21. The defendant claimed that he was traveling at approximately 60
miles per hour. [d. at 121.
12. [d. at 121. The defendant claimed that his car pulled to the right. [d.
13. [d.

14. [d. The defendant's blood-alcohol level was above the legal limit. See CAL. VEH.
CODE §§ 23152(b), 23153(b) (West Supp. 1993).
15. Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 12l.
16. [d.
17. [d.
18. [d. In the doctor's opinion, the very low heart rate was the result of the fetus's

inability to breath; it had been in the process of dying for a while prior to the Caesarian
section. Based on these heartbeats, the doctor later characterized the birth medically as
a "live birth." [d.
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air into its lungs. 19 Its heartbeat was checked again two or three
minutes later, but none was detected. 20 The doctor continued to
try to resuscitate the fetus for some fourteen minutes, but to no
avail; it never began breathing. 21 Ms. Bacon's fetus was declared
dead at 10:28 p.m. 22
Ms. Bacon's gynecologist had examined her eight days
before the car accident and found that her pregnancy was progressing normally.23 An autopsy showed that the fetus was a
fully developed, substantially normal 24 female with no obvious
physical trauma. 25 The fetus did, however, have one improperly
functioning lung; it contained substantially less oxygen than did
the other lung. 26 The fetus had been in distress prior to birth as
evidenced by its aspiration of amniotic fluid. 27 Although, in the
medical examiner's opinion, the fetus died during the perinatal
period 28 from undetermined causes,29 she did identify the automobile accident as a contributing cause and could discern no
medical reason to believe the fetus would have been born In a
distressed condition had the accident not occurred. 30
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The defendant was charged by information with gross vehic19. [d. This process is called intubation. [d.
20. [d.
21. [d. Some air was forced into the fetus's lungs as a result of the intubation; this,

h6wever, is not breathing. [d.
22. [d.

23. [d. At that time, Ms. Bacon was thirty-eight weeks pregnant and the fetus had a
heart rate of less than forty beats per minute. Ms. Bacon's due date was February 14,
1990. Ms. Bacon had been admitted to the hospital from December 26 through December 29, 1989, for premature labor. She previously had given birth prematurely to an
anencephalic baby. [d. at 121-22.
24. The fetus appeared normal except for two extra fingers; these were mere tags of
flesh and represented a trivial congenital birth defect. [d. at 122.
25. [d. at 121.
26. [d. at 122.
27. [d.
28. The perinatal period is defined as the period immediately before, during and
after birth. [d.
29. The finding of death from undetermined causes was a function of the operation
of a number of factors in a perinatal death, which normally permits no anatomical findings. There are three separate systems at work in perinatal deaths: the fetus, the mother
and the placenta. This means that there will normally be a variety of factors involved in
a perinatal death and, at the autopsy stage, it generally is impossible to determine separately the precise operation of these factors. [d.
30. Id.
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ular manslaughter while intoxicated. s1 The magistrate at the
preliminary hearing in municipal court found sufficient cause to
believe that the defendant was guilty and thus ordered that he
be held to answer to the offense in superior court. S2 The defense
moved to set aside the information pursuant to California Penal
Code section 995 on grounds that there was not probable cause
to believe the defendant was guilty of manslaughter because
there was insufficient evidence that the victim was a "human being" within the meaning of the manslaughter statute. ss The superior court granted the motion. S4 The People of the State of
California appeal from this order.31i
COURT'S ANALYSIS
In an appeal from the superior court's order granting a defendant's section 995 motion, the appellate court ignores such
order and instead directly reviews the magistrate's decision to
31. [d.
32. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(a) (West Supp. 1993).
Sufficient cause within the meaning of section 872 is generally
equivalent to that reasonable or probable cause required to
justify an arrest. Sufficient cause and reasonable and probable
cause mean such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.

It is clear, however, that evidence which will justify prosecution under the above test need not be sufficient to support a
conviction. An information will not be set aside ... if there is
some rational ground for assuming the possibility that an offense has been committed and the accused is guilty of it ....
[I)f there is some evidence to support the information, the [reviewing) court will not inquire into its sufficiency .... Finally,
although there must be some showing as to the existence of
each element of the charged crime such a showing may be
made by means of circumstantial evidence supportive of reasonable inferences on the part of the magistrate.
Williams v. Superior Court, 458 P.2d 987, 989-90 (Cal. 1969) (citations, footnotes, and
quotations omitted).
33. Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122. "[T]he information shall be set aside by the court
in which the defendant is arraigned, upon his or her motion, ... [i]f ... the defendant
had been committed [i.e., held to answer] without reasonable or probable cause." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 995(a) (West Supp. 1993). A defendant's 995 motion is, in effect, an appeal of the magistrate's holding (commitment) order at the preliminary hearing in municipal court because the superior court sits merely as a reviewing court. See People v.
Laiwa, 669 P.2d 1278, 1281 (Cal. 1983).
34. Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122.
35. [d. at 120, 122.
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hold the defendant to answer.36 Although the appellate court
must draw every legitimate inference in favor of the 'information,
it cannot substitute its own judgment as to the credibility or
weight of the evidence for that of the magistrate. 37
The defendant was charged with gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated in violation of California Penal Code section 191.5(a).38 That section requires, in pertinent part, the
"killing of a human being."39 Under the common law "born
alive" rule, the term "human being" as used in .California homicide law means only a person who has been born alive, not a
fetus. 4o Even apart from the common law rule, omission of the
term "fetus" from California's manslaughter statutes was an ex36. Id. at 122 (citing Laiwa, 669 P.2d at 1282).
37. See id. (citing Laiwa, 669 P.2d at 1281-82).
38. Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 191.5(a) (West Supp. 1993).
39. Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122. Subdivision (a) of that section provides in its
entirety:
(a) Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the
unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle, where the driving was in
violation of Section 23152 or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and
the killing was either the proximate result of the commission
of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross
negligence, or the proximate result of the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner,
and with gross negligence.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 191.5(a) (West Supp. 1993) (emphasis added); see Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 122. As to Vehicle Code sections 23152 and 23153, see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
40. See Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122 (citing People v. Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. 830,
838 (Ct. App. 1978)). The California Penal Code does not define the term "human being"
as it is used in the homicide statutes. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 625 n.16
(Cal. 1970). The common law may properly be looked to for the meaning of "human
being." Id. at 619. See generally B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EpSTEIN. CALIFORNIA CRIMI.NAL LAW § 46 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1992).
Use of the past tense of birth is somewhat misleading. In California, a completed
birth is not necessarily required.
Reduced to its essence, People v. Chavez, supra, stands
for no more than the proposition that a killing in the course of
the birth of a demonstrably alive and viable fetus is the killing
of a human being to the same extent as is the killing of a fully
born live child .... Chavez does not stand for the proposition
that a technically viable fetus is a human being if it is in the
process of being born even though it exhibits no sign of life.
Rather, it must be living during a birth which, in the natural
course of events, would be completed successfully.
Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124 (citations omitted); Keeler, 470 P.2d at 628-29; People v.
Chavez, 176 P.2d 92, 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947)).
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ercise of legislative judgment."1 Consequently, the issue is
whether Ms. Bacon's fetus was born alive and therefore became
a "human being" within the meaning of the manslaughter
statute.42
Although the common law is not entirely consistent on the
issue of when a fetus is born alive, circulation is not in itself
sufficient proof of a live birth; there must also be respiration."3
Consequently, evidence that Ms. Bacon's fetus had a faint, slow
heartbeat lasting no more than a few minutes is insufficient in
itself to establish that the fetus was born alive by common law
standards. 44
Whatever result might be reached under common law stan- .
dards, courts may resort to a common law definition of a state of
being only when there is no statutory definition. 4!! California
Health and Safety Code section 7180(a) defines death as the
lack of (1) circulation and respiration, or (2) brain activity.46 But
inasmuch as death is merely the obverse of life, a statutory definition of death may be used to determine the presence of life."7
Accordingly, that section provides the best means of determining whether a fetus is born alive."s Consequently, under the
obverse of section 7180(a), a fetus is born alive, and therefore
becomes a "human being" within the meaning of the manslaughter statute, if it exhibits some sign of (1) circulation49 or respira41. Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122 (citing Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 838).
42. See id.
43. [d. at 125 (citing State v. Green, 781 P.2d 678, 681-83 (Kan. 1989)). But in Morgan u. State, a few weak heartbeats were sufficient to establish a live birth'by common
law standards. 256 S.W. 433, 434 (Tenn. 1923). That case is distinguishable, however, in
that the criminal acts which caused the infant's death occurred after its birth. "In that
context, that the allegedly criminal act precedes the infant's drawing of a breath assuredly does not establish that the infant is not yet born alive when it is killed." Flores, 4
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124-25.
44. Flores, 4 Cal Rptr. 2d at 125.
. 45. [d. (citing People v. Mitchell, 183 Cal. Rptr. 166, 169 n.2 (Ct. App. 1982)).
46. [d. "An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire
brain, including the brain stem, is dead." CAL, HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180(a) (West
Supp. 1993) (emphasis added); Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 125.
47. Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 125 (citing State v. Cornelius, 448 N.W.2d 434, 436
(Wis. 1989)).
48. [d. at 125 (citing cf. Mitchell, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 169 n.2 (applying statutory,
rather than common law, definition of "death")).
49. The existence at birth of an independent heartbeat alone is sufficient to establish that there has been no irreversible cessation of the metabolic functions of circulation
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tion,60 and (2) brain activity, during or after its birth. 61
Although Ms. Bacon's fetus exhibited at least a weak circulation, it exhibited no signs of brain activity.62 Accordingly, the
People failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that the
fetus was born alive and thus a "human being" as that term is
used in the manslaughter statute. 63 As such, the magistrate's implied factual find'ing to the contrary is not supported by the evidence. 64 The order of dismissal is affirmed. 66
CRITIQUE
The common law "born alive" rule was reaffirmed in California over twenty years ago in Keeler v. Superior Court,66 perhaps the most widely-noted opinion on the subject of homicide
of the unborn child. 67 The defendant in that case brutally attacked his ex-wife with the expressed intention of "stomping"
her fetus out of her.68 The attack killed the fetus 69 and the deand respiration. Id. (citing Cornelius, 448 N.W.2d at 436).
50. Breathing (respiration) apparently does not occur without some form of brain
activity. Id. at 125-26 (citing Cornelius, 448 N.W.2d at 436). This perhaps may be inferred by a layperson or may need to be established by expert medical testimony. But
these issues need not be reached because there is no evidence whatsoever that Ms. Bacon's fetus even attempted breathing. Id. at 126.
51. See id. at l25. The Flores court did not articulate the test for presence of life
other than to merely say: "Since death is present when only one of the prongs of the
statute is satisfied, neither must be satisfied for life to be present." I d. Therefore, the
test would appear to be: an individual who has sustained neither (1) irreversible cessation of the circulatory and respiratory functions, nor (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is alive. Put more simply, an individual who has some (1) circulation or respiration, and (2) brain activity, is alive. See id. at
125-26.
52. Id. at 126.
53.Id.
54.Id.
55.Id.
56. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
57. Clarke D. Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The Born Alive Rule and
Other Legal Anachronisms, 21 VAL. U. L. R. 563, 603 (1987).
58. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 618. The defendant intercepted his ex-wife on a mountain
road five months after their divorce and discovered that she was pregnant by another
man. This so enraged him that he exclaimed "I'm going to stomp it out of you," pushed
her, hit her in the face several times, and shoved his knee into her abdomen. Id.
59. The fetus died in utero of a severely fractured skull and hemorrhaging as a result of the force applied to the mother's abdomen. Id. The fetus was estimated to be
about eight and one-half months old with a seventy-five to ninety-six percent chance of
survival if it had been born prematurely immediately prior to the attack. Id. at 619 &
n.1.
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fendant was charged with its murder.60 The California Supreme
Court issued a peremptory writ of prohibition preventing his
prosecution. 61 The court followed the "born alive" rule 62 and
thus interpreted the murder statute's63 use of the term "human
being" to exclude fetuses. 64
In response to the perceived injustice of the Keeler decision,
the California Legislature amended the murder statute to provide for "the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus" with
exceptions for (1) legal abortions, (2) acts by a physician to save
the life of the mother of the fetus, and (3) acts solicited, aided,
abetted, or consented to by the mother of the fetus. 61i The courts
60. Id. at 619.
61. Id. at 630.

62. The court traced the rule to America from early English common law citing
Bracton, Hale, Hawkins, Coke, and Blackstone. Id. at 620-22. The court then traced the
legislative history of the murder statute and concluded that the Legislature intended the
term "human being" to have its common law meaning. Id. at 619, 622-24. The court
refused to abandon the rule as obsolete because, as a matter of jurisdiction, that power is
vested in the Legislature, not the judiciary, and, as a matter of constitutional principle,
retroactive expansion of the statute would violate due process. Id. at 624-30.
63. At that time, the murder statute provided in its entirety: "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought." CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West
1970) (amended 1971).
64. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 622, 624.
65. 1970 Cal. Stat. ch. 1311, § 1, at 2440. The murder statute now provides in its
entirety:
(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus,
with malice aforethought.
(b) This section shall not apply to any person who commits an
act which results in the death of a fetus if any of the following
apply:
(1) The act complied with the Therapeutic Abortion
Act, Chapter 11 (commencing with Section 25950) of
Division 20 of the Health and Safety Code.
(2) The act was committed by a holder of a physician's
and surgeon's certificate, as defined in the Business and
Professions Code, in a case where, to a medical certainty, the result of childbirth would be death of the
mother of the fetus or where her death from childbirth,
although not medically certain, would be substantially
certain or more likely than not.
(3) The act was solicited, aided, abetted, or consented
to by the mother of the fetus.
(c) Subdivision (b) shall not be construed to prohibit the prosecution of any person under any other provision of law.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988). For the text of the murder statute prior to its
amendment in 1971, see supra note 63. As to Keeler and the legislative response thereto,
see generally WITKIN. supra note 40, § 450; Robert W. MacCartee, Note, Infanticide in
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imposed an additional exception for nonviable fefuses; to be the
victim of murder, the fetus must have been viable 66 in the sense
California: The Impact of Keeler y. Superior Court of Amador County and the September 17, 1970, Amendment to Penal Code Section 187, 7 CAL. W. L. REV. 272 (1970);
Borden D. Webb, Comment, Is the Intentional Killing of an Unborn Child Homicide?
California's Law to Punish the Willful Killing of a Fetus, 2 PAC. L.J. 170 (1971); cf.
Louis E. Boyle, Comment, The Fetus as a Legal Entity-Facing Reality, 8 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 126 (1971) (comment mistakenly states that the Legislature amended the murder
and manslaughter statutes to provide that "human being" includes a fetus).
66. People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502-503 (Ct. App. 1976).
[Ujntil viability has been reached the state has no interest in
the fetus that it is entitled to protect against the wishes of the
mother. The underlying rationale of Wade, therefore, is that
until viability is reached, human life in the legal sense has not
. come into existence. Implicit in Wade is the conclusion that as
a matter of constitutional law the destruction of a non-viable
fetus is not a taking of human life. It follows that such destruction cannot constitute murder or other form of homicide,
whether committed by a mother, a father (as here), or a third
person.
Id. at 502. The Smith decision has been criticized as unnecessarily broadening the scope
of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), beyond its constitutional context.
An accurate reading of Roe dictates, as scholars have increasingly concluded, that it .does not apply to the context of nonconsensual third party acts against the unborn child .
. . . Roe "was limited to the regulation of the voluntary
abortion." Moreover, ... while Roe involved the right of privacy of the mother, "no countervailing privacy right" was
presented in the case of unconsented to violent acts by a third
party.
. . . [T)he principle that the unborn child does not have
constitutional rights when balanced against the woman's constitutional right to privacy does not at all mean that the fetus
may not have common law or statutory rights when balanced
against the criminal acts of a third party .... Roe v. Wade is
not directed to non consensual acts by third parties. It is not a
bar to judicial or statutory recognition of the rights of the unborn child against ... criminal acts of third parties.
Forsythe, supra note 57, at 614-19 (footnotes omitted) (quoting State v. Brown, 378 So.
2d 916, 919 (La. 1979) (Blanche, J., dissenting)); see People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203, 215
(Ill. 1980) (Clark, J., dissenting: "Exteriding the protection of the criminal law to, at
least, viable fetuses would in no way infringe upon the mother's right to privacy which
was the linchpin of Roe v. Wade.").
And yet there is an incongruity in criminally punishing a third person for doing
essentially what the pregnant woman herself has a right to do. Boyle, supra note 65, at
134; see MacCartee, supra note 65, at 285 ("It is inherently unjust to hold one answerable for homicide of a fetus which, at the time of the act, could not sustain life outside its
mother's womb."). Perhaps the soundest rationale for limiting third party criminalliability to the homicide of viable fetuses is to avoid difficult legal and philosophical problems
with proving causation (i.e., that the defendant caused the fetus not to be born alive).
See John P. Nahra, Comment, Feticide in California: A Proposed Statutory Scheme, 12
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that it could have survived the trauma of birth on its own or
with artificial medical aid. 57 In amending the murder statute,
the Legislature did not abandon the "born alive" rule; that is, it
did not redefine "human being" to include fetuses. 58 Rather, it
implicitly endorsed the "born alive" rule; a contrary conclusion
would render the phrase "or a fetus" superfluous and criminal
statutes should be construed to avoid rendering any of their
words superfluous. 59
But the Legislature failed to similarly amend the manslaughter statutes. 70 This failure was not due to legislative oversight. 71 The legislative history of the bill72 that amended the
murder statute clearly indicates that the failure to similarly
amend the manslaughter statutes was an exercise of legislative
judgment. 73 The Legislature felt that the key reason for making
a fetus the subject of murder was the defendant's extreme culpability,74 and since that same level of purpose is not involved with
manslaughter,7~ the change should not apply to it.78 Accordingly,
u.c.

DAVIS L. REV. 723, 735-36 nn.58-60 (1979).
67. People v. Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. 830, 835-37 (Ct. App. 1978); People v. Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. 837, 853 (Ct. App. 1990).
68. Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914 (Ct. App. 1977). This was a
conscious choice by the Legislature. Earlier versions of the bill had redefined "human
being" to include a fetus into or beyond the twentieth week of uterogestation. Webb,
supra note 65, at 172-75.
69. Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 809 P.2d 404, 414 n.22 (Cal. 1991). See
generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 4 (West 1988); WITKIN, supra note 40, § 36.
70. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 191.5, 192 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 122; Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 838; People v. Carlson, 112 Cal. Rptr. 321, 325 (Ct.
App. 1974).
71. Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 838. Even if the failure were due to legislative oversight, correction would have to be by the Legislature. Carlson, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
72. A.B. 816, Cal. Leg., Reg. 'Sess. (1970).
73. Flores, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122; Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 838; Webb, supra note
65, at 170, 172-175, 181. Indeed, earlier versions of the bill applied to both murder and
manslaughter. Webb, supra note 65, at 172, 174.
74. Murder is an unlawful killing with malice aforethought (or where. the felonymurder rule is properly applied). Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 839; see CAL. PENAL CODE §
187 (West 1988). A killing where the defendant either (1) intended to kill or do great
bodily injury to the victim and did not act during a reasonable heat of passion, or (2)
recklessly caused the victim's death under circumstances showing such wantoness and a
conscious disregard for life that the defendant is said to have an "abandoned and malignant heart," is with malice aforethought and thus is murder. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 188
(West 1988). See generally WITKIN, supra note 40, §§ 486-509; THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY,
CALIFORNIA. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL forms 8.10-.31, 8.51-.52 (West 1993)
[hereinafter CALJIC).
75. Absent 8 permissible application of the felony-murder rule, manslaughter is an
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in California there is no crime of manslaughter of a fetus" and
the courts cannot create one by judicial fiat.7s Consequently,
whether fetal manslaughter ought to be a crime continues to be
a question for the Legislature to address, not the judiciary.79
Other criminal statutes do not already proscribe the acts
which would be proscribed by a fetal manslaughter statute. so For
unlawful killing without malice. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 191.5, 192 (West 1988 & Supp.
1993); Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 839; Carlson, -112 Cal. Rptr. at 326-27 (finding that
lower court improperly applied transferred intent and felony-murder rules to killing of
fetus). A killing where the defendant either (1) intended to kill or do great bodily injury
to the victim and acted during a reasonable heat of passion (called voluntary manslaughter), or (2) caused the victim's death by gross (or in some cases, ordinary) negligence
(called involuntary or vehicular manslaughter), is without malice and thus is manslaughter. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 191.5, 192 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). See generally WITKIN.
supra note 40, §§ 510-31; CALJIC, supra note 74, forms 8.37-.51.
76. Webb, supra note 65, at 174.
77. Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 838; Carlson, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 324-27.
78. Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39. "No act or omission ... is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this Code .... " CAL. PENAL CODE § 6 (West
1988). The same conclusion was reached with regard to fetal murder before the murder
statute was amended:
Penal Code section 6 ... embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i. e., that subject to
the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties is vested
exclusively in the legislative branch. Stated differently, there
are no common law crimes in California .
. . . Whether to thus extend liability for murder [of a fetus) in California is a determination solely within the province
of the Legislature. For a court to simply declare, by judicial
fiat, that the time has now come to prosecute under section
187 one who kills an unborn but viable fetus would indeed be
to rewrite the statute under the guise of construing it.
Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 624-26 (Cal. 1970) (citations and footnote omitted). See generally WITKIN. supra note 40, § 14.
79. See supra note 73; Carlson, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
80. Prosecutors have occasionally attempted to stretch existing.criminal statutes to
cover injury or death to a fetus, usually caused by its mother. For example, the crime of
child endangerment provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who, under circumstances or conditions
likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes
or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable
physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or
.health of such child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation that its person
or health is endangered, is [guilty of a felony).
(2) Any person who [does the same as described in subdivision (1), except) under circumstances or conditions other
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example, despite dicta to the contrary in some cases,8} the crime
of abortion 82 might not proscribe fetal killings that are not consented to by the mother of the fetus. 83 In any event, abortion
than those likely to produce great bodily harm or death, ... is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(1)'(West 1988). This crime does not apply to fetuses or maternal prenatal misconduct, such as illegal drug use during pregn.ancy. Reyes v. Superior
Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 913-15 (Ct. App. 1977).
Similarly, the crime of failure to provide for a child provides in pertinent part:
If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful
excuse, to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical
attendance, or other remedial care for his or her child, he or
she is guilty of a misdemeanor .... A child conceived' but not
yet born is to be deemed an existing person insofar as this
section is concerned.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988). This crime also apparently does not proscribe maternal prenatal misconduct that could injure the fetus, such as illegal drug use. See Rebecca Manson & Judy Marolt, A New Crime: Fetal Neglect: State Intervention to Protect the Unborn-Protection at What Cost?, 24 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 161, 169-70 (1988).
81. The California Supreme Court said in dicta:
It is ... no defense to a charge of violating section 274 that
the act was ... by a method not commonly used for that purpose [of procuring a miscarriage). The prohibition is against
"any means which might be used to effect a miscarriage," and
has been applied to instances of beating or other physical violence inflicted upon the person of the woman for this purpose.
Keeler, 470 P.2d at 627-28 (citation omitted) (quoting People v. Clapp, 153 P.2d 758, 761
(Cal. Ct. App. 1944)). And the court in People v. Smith said in dicta: "The un viable
fetus does not go unprotected. As happened here, [the non consensual) destruction of an
unviable fetus may be punished under the criminal abortion statute, Penal Code section
274." People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 503-504 (Ct. App. 1976).
82. The California abortion statute provides in its entirety:
Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to
any women, or procures any woman to take any medicine,
drug, or substance, or uses or employs any instrument or other
means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman, except as provided in the Therapeutic
Abortion Act, Chapter 11 (commencing with Section 25950) of
Division 20 of the Health and Safety Code, is punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West 1988); see also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 275, 276 (West 1988)
(solicitation of abortion); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1108 (West 1985) ("the defendant cannot
be convicted upon the testimony of the woman upon or with whom the offense was committed, unless she is corroborated by other evidence"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.9 (West
Supp. 1993) (sentence enhancement for intentional infliction of injury upon pregnant
woman causing termination of pregnancy).
83. Nahra, supra note 66, at 726, 729-32. The statute is ambiguous as to the prohibited "means" of abortion. Arguably, the phrase "any ... other means whatever" is restricted in scope by the previous specific proscriptions which uniformly involve consensual miscarriages. Id. at 730. Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, general words in a
criminal statute are limited to matters similar to those previously specifically stated.
People v. Silver, 108 P.2d 4, 7-8 (Cal. 1940); People v. Fields, 164 Cal. Rptr. 336, 338 (Ct.
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only proscribes certain intentional fetal killings,8. whereas a fetal manslaughter statute would proscribe intentional and unintentional fetal killings. 86 Thus, the anomaly in California criminal law-that fetal murder is a crime but the logically lesserincluded offense of fetal manslaughter is not-remains. 86
App. 1980). See generally WITKIN. supra note 40, § 26. But dicta by the California Supreme Court might nevertheless be binding on the lower California courts. See People v.
Triggs, 506 P.2d 232, 236 (Cal. 1973).
84. The statute states in pertinent part that the defendant must act "with intent
thereby to procure a miscarriage." CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West 1988). Apparently, the
defendant must actually intend that the fetus miscarry, not merely that it die within the
womb.
In the present case, it will be remembered, petitioner's avowed
goal was not primarily to kill the fetus while it was inside his
wife's body, but rather to "stomp it out of" her; although one
presumably cannot be done without the other,. petitioner's
choice of words is significant and strongly implies an "intent
thereby to procure the miscarriage" of his wife in violation of
section 274.
Keeler, 470 P.2d at 627-28. "It is doubtful, however, that defendants in the Keeler mode
ever intended to accomplish anything but the killing of the fetus." Nahra, supra note 66,
at 732 n.41.
85. It has been argued that "[tlhe most significant negative effect of the manslaughter gap is its failure to prohibit intentional fetal killing accompanied by the mental element associated with voluntary manslaughter." Nahra, supra note 66, at 727. It is interesting to note that the Legislature may not have achieved its goal of nullifying the
Keeler decision when it amended the murder statute. The defendant in Keeler may have
acted under a reasonable heat of passion and thus mitigated the crime from murder to
voluntary manslaughter. If that were the case, he would escape criminal punishment
even under today's homicide laws. He was certainly in a heat of passion. And that heat
of passion would be reasonable if a jury believed q) that discovering that his ex-wife'
became pregnant by another man during their marriage was an adequate provocation,
and (2) that a reasonable man would not have cooled-down after first learning of this
and before acting. See generally WITKIN, supra note 40, §§ 511-17; CALJIC, supra note
74, forms 8.40-.44.
A related problem with the "manslaughter gap" is that since a jury instruction on
fetal manslaughter is not required, a jury that is given the all-or-nothing choice of murder or acquittal may be more likely to convict a defendant of fetal murder even when
fetal manslaughter would have been more appropriate. Nahra, supra note 66, at 727-28.
Contra People v. Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. 830, 838-39 (Ct. App. 1978).
86. Nahra, supra note 66, at 727.
.
The manslaughter gap is logically at odds with the intrinsic relationship between murder and manslaughter. Manslaughter is inherently a lesser and included offense of murder.
By definition, the only difference between the crimes of murder and manslaughter is the mental state of the actor. If a
subject can be a murder victim, then logically that subject can
be the victim of manslaughter if certain circumstances result
in a mitigation of malice. The status of the victim should be
irrelevant in distinguishing between the two crimes. To distinguish the crimes in terms of the victim's status is tantamount

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993

53

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 10

1094 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1081

The original rationale for the common law "born alive" rule
is no longer valid and thus provides no justification for excluding
fetuses as potential victims of manslaughter. 87 The "born alive"
rule was well-established at common law by the mid-17th century.88 The rule did not develop as a substantive moral definition of a human being; that is, it did not reflect a common law
belief -that fetuses were not worthy of the protection of criminal
law. 89 Rather, the rule developed merely as an evidentiary preto acknowledging a qualitatively significant distinction between the mental state of a murderer of a fetus and the murderer of a human being. Such a distinction has no basis in fact
or reason.
[d. at 729 (footnotes omitted).
87. See Forsythe, supra note 57; passim; MacCartee, supra note at 65, at 272-73,
285.
88. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 620-21 (Cal. 1970) (quoting common law
authorities Bracton, Coke, Blackstone, Hale, and Hawkins, and noting that early common law, possibly reflecting doctrines of medieval canon law, may have been otherwise).
Perhaps the most influential statement of the ~'born alive"
rule is that of Coke, in mid-17th century: "If a woman be
quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth it in
her wombe, or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dyeth in
her body, and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great
misprision [i. e., misdemeanor], and no murder; but if the
childe be born alive and dyeth of the potion, battery, or other
cause, this is murder; for in law it is accounted a reasonable
creature, in rerum natura, when it is born alive." (3 Coke, Institutes "58 (1648).) ... [T]he common law accepted his views
as authoritative. In the 18th century, for example, Coke's requirement that an infant be born alive in order to be the subject of homicide was reiterated and expanded by both Blackstone and Hale.
[d. at 620 (footnotes omitted). See generally Forsythe, supra note 57, at 583-585; Cyril
C. Means, Jr., The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus,
1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411, 420 (1968); Stanley B. Atkinson, Life, Birth, and Live-Birth, 20 L.Q. Rev. 134, 135 (1904); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT. JR.. CRIMINAL LAW § 7.l(c) (2d ed. 1986); ROLLIN M. PERKINS
& RONALD N. BOYCE. CRIMINAL LAW chap. 2, § l(B) (3d ed. 1982); CHARLES E. TORCIA. 2
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW §§ 112, 114 (14th ed. 1979 & Supp. 1991); OSCAR L. WARREN &
BASIL M. BILAS. 1 WARREN ON HOMICIDE § 55 (1938); 40 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, Homicide § 9 (2d ed. 1968 & Supp. 1992); 40 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, Homicide § 3(b) (1991);
WITKIN. supra note 40, § 450; Annotation, Homicide Based on Killing of Unborn Child,
40 A.L.R. 3d 444, 446-47 (1971 & Supp. 1992); Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Proof of
Live Birth in Prosecution for Killing Newborn Child, 65 A.L.R. 3d 413, 415-16 (1975 &
Supp. 1992); State v. McKee, 1 Add. 1 (Pa. 1791) (earliest published American decision
adopting "born alive" rule); People v. Eldridge, 86 P. 832 (1906) (earliest California decision adopting "born alive" rule in dictum); People v. Chavez, 176 P.2d 92 (1947) (same
except not dictum); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.l(c) & cmt. 4(c) (Proposed Official Draft
1980) (adopting "born alive" rule to avoid entanglement of abortion in the law of
homicide)..
,
89. Forsythe, supra note 57, at 586, 589. If the rule was a substantive definition of a
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sumption that the fetus was already dead at the time of the defendant's act or would have been born dead; this presumption
was rebuttable by proof of the fetus's subsequent live birth.90
This presumption was predicated on the extremely high infant
mortality rate and poor medical knowledge of the time which
made the task of proving that the defendant caused the fetus's
death a practical impossibility, except by proof of a subsequent
live birth. 91 But this is no longer the case; modern medical scihuman being, then the victim would need to be a human being both at the time of the
injury and at the time of death in order for the corpus delicti of homicide to be satisfied.
In practice, the born alive rule was applied to proscribe as
homicide the killing of a child even if the mortal injuries were
inflicted in utero. If the rule was truly a substantive definition
of human being, and a fetus only became a human being at
birth, then injuring an unborn child in utero would not be injuring a human being. In that case, the death of the child out
of the womb could not satisfy the corpus delicti, because the
criminal agency of the defendant-the moral connection between the infliction of the injury and the resulting
death-would not exist. The child would not be a human being both at the time of the injury and the time of the death. If
the born alive rule was a substantive rule, then homicide could
. only result from injuries inflicted after birth, because only
then would they be inflicted on "a human being."
[d. at 589 (footnotes omitted); see also LAFAVE, supra note 88, § 3.11 (discussing requirement that defendant's mental state and act must concur in time).
90. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 633 (Burke, J., dissenting); People v. Chavez, 176 P.2d 92, 95
(Cal. Ct. App. 1947); Annotation, Homicide Based on Killing of Unborn Child, 40 A.L.R.
3d 444, 446-47 (1971 & Supp. 1992); Forsythe, supra note 57, passim; Webb, supra note
65, at 176; MacCartee, supra note 65, at 279, 281.
91. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 633 (Burke, J., dissenting); Annotation, Homicide Based on
Killing of Unborn Child, 40 A.L.R. 3d 444, 446-47 (1971 & Supp. 1992); Forsythe, supra
note 57, passim; Webb, supra note 65, at 176; MacCartee, supra note 65, at 279, 281.
The "born alive" rule is analogous to two other common law evidentiary rules that
developed out of the primitive state of medical science at common law: the "year-and-aday" rule and the rule defining death itself. Many states have abolished these rules in
whole or in part. Forsythe, supra note 54, at 592-95; see e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 194
(West 1988).
We commonly conceive of human existence as a spectrum
stretching from birth to death. However, if this court properly
might expand the the definition of "human being" at one end
of that spectrum, we may do so at the other end. Consider the
following example: All would agree that ... a corpse is not
considered a "human being" and thus cannot be the subject of
a "killing" as those terms are used in homicide statutes. However, it is readily apparent that our concepts of what constitutes a "corpse" have been and are continually modified by
advances ·in the field of medicine . . . . Would this court ignore these developments and exonerate the killer of an apparently "drowned" child merely because that child would have
been pronounced dead in 1648 or 1850? Obviously not.
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ence has progressed to the point of eliminating or at least seriously weakening the evidentiary problems which confronted the
common law. 92 Accordingly, the original rationale for the "born
alive" rule is no longer valid and on this basis the rule itself is
obsolete and anachronistic. 93
The "born alive" rule has also been criticized because it
leads to unjust, arbitrary, and anomalous results. 94 If the fetus
survives long enough to take a single breath during or after its
birth, the defendant committed homicide.9~ But if the fetus dies
a moment before that, then homicide has not occurred. 96 Criminal liability thus often depends on the fortuitous circumstance
of proximity to a hospital so that a doctor can deliver the fetus
in time to witness its death outside the womb. 97
Whether a homicide occurred in that case would be determined by medical testimony regarding the capability of the
child to have survived prior to the defendant's act. And that is
precisely the test which this court should adopt in the instant
case.
Keeler, 470 P.2d at 632 (Burke, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
92. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 633 (Burke, J., dissenting); Annotation, Homicide Based on
Killing of Unborn Child, 40 A.L.R. 3d 444, 446-47 (1971 & Supp. 1992); Forsythe, supra
note 57, passim; Webb, supra note 65, at 176; MacCartee, supra note 65, at 279, 281.
93. Forsythe, supra note 57, passim; MacCartee, supra note at 65, at 272-73, 285.
Despite these criticisms, most states by court decision still follow the "born alive"
rule. Forsythe, supra note 57, at 596 n.161. Only three state courts have abandoned the
rule. State v. Burrell, 699 P.2d 499 (Kan. 1985); Commonwealth v. Cass, 476 N.E.2d 1324
(Mass. 1984); State v. Horne, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984); Forsythe, supra note 57, at 596,
n.162. Several other states, like California, have abandoned the rule, at least to some
extent, by statute. Forsythe, supra note 57, at 596-97, n.163.
94. People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203, 207 (III. 1980); see Commonwealth v. Cass, 467
N.E.2d 1324, 1325-26 (Mass. 1984); State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah 1979);
People v. Bolar, 440 N.E.2d 639, 644 (III. App. Ct. 1982).
95. See Greer, 402 N.E.2d at 207; supra notes 40 and 88 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 95.
97. See Greer, 402 N.E.2d at 207. It has similarly been argued:
The absurdity of the born alive concept is obvious when you
consider the thousands of premature babies born every year. A
prematurely delivered infant is every bit as dependent upon
an incubator for life as it would be of its mother had it not
been born early. Certainly, if one was to murder a premature
baby in an incubator he would have committed homicide. But
the born alive rule would hold that there is no homicide where
one unlawfully kills the very same infant still in its mother's
womb. It is inescapable that the born alive doctrine is irrational and obsolete.
MacCartee, supra note 65, at 282.
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Because of the anachronistic98 and arbitrary99 nature of the
common law "born alive" rule and the inherent practical
problems with punishing fetal murder but not fetal manslaughter/ oo the California Legislature may choose to make fetal manslaughter a crime. If it does, the privacy rights lOI of the fetus's
mother justify exempting her from liability for fetal manslaughter, just as she is exempted from liability for fetal murder. lo2
The pregnant woman's constitutional right to abortion requires
her exemption from liability for acts committed before her fetus
becomes viable. lo3 And her generalized interest in exercising autonomy over her person justifies exempting her from liability for
acts committed after viability as well; otherwise, this interest
would be too greatly curtailed because of the broad scope of acts
proscribed by manslaughter lo4 and the fact that her unborn
98. See supra note 87-93 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 94-97 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 80-86 a~d accompanying text.
101. The right to privacy is the right of freedom of choice in certain traditional
specific familial, marital, sexual, and reproductive matters. See e.g., Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (child rearing and education); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (sexuality). See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.26
(4th ed. 1991).
102. See supra note 65. It would also be anomalous to punish a woman for the less
culpable crime of manslaughter of her own fetus and yet exempt her from liability for
the more culpable crime of murder of her own fetus. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
103. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); cf. supra note 66.
[T]he pregnant woman has an unqualified right to abort
before viability. Her right of privacy is absolute until this
stage of the pregnancy. Thus, it would seem to follow that the
state has no constitutionally legitimate interest in protecting
the well-being of previable fetuses. According to this reasoning, the greater would include the lesser ....
Richard J. Bonnie, Developments in Mental Health Law: Interventions for Prenat,al
Misconduct, INST. OF L.. PSYCHIATRY & PUB. POL'y. U. OF VA., July-Dec. 1990, at 21, 31.
This limitation is admittedly problematic because prenatal hazards pose their greatest
threat early in pregnancy. Kathleen Nolan, Protecting Fetuses from Prenatal Hazards:
Whose Crimes? What Punishment?, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS. Winter/Spring 1990, at 13, 1617.
104. Manslaughter does not proscribe specific acts. Rather, it proscribes any unlawful act without malice aforethought which causes death. See supra note 75. The criminal
law may have a role to play in deterring and punishing more specific and particularly
egregious acts of maternal prenatal misconduct which cause the fetus's death or serious
injury. Paul A. Logli, Drugs in the Womb: The Newest Battlefield in the War on Drugs,
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS. Winter/Spring 1990, at 23, 28. The limitation to unlawful acts is
problematic as well since many acts which are currently legal (such as drinking alcohol)
may nevertheless pose great dangers to the developing fetus. See Comment, Criminal
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child is physically a part of her body. 1011
Liability of a Prospectiue Mother for Prenatal Neglect of a Viable Fetus, WHI'ITIER L.
REV. 363, 389-90 (1987). Pregnant women can unintentionally harm 'their fetuses in a
multitude of ways, including illicit drug use, immoderate exercise, and sexual intercourse
late in the pregnancy. See generally Symposium, Criminal Liability for Fetal Endangerment, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1990, at 11, passim; Maternal Smoking Linked
to Cross-Eyed Newborns, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 28, 1992, at Dl.
105. It has been argued that:
[G)ranting a fetus rights in ... criminal law by allowing the
state to criminally prosecute a pregnant woman for exercising
her physical autonomy in such a way as to unintentionally
cause damage or death to her fetus, results in an unacceptable
statism and entails a deprivation of a pregnant woman's constitutional rights to privacy, autonomy and bodily integrity .

. . . [T)he fact that an unborn child is physically a part of
its mother mandates that a state exercise even greater caution
in attempting to set minimum standards of conduct, lest it unduly infringe upon a pregnant woman's constitutional right to
exercise autonomy over her person .
. . . [T)he intimate relationship between the mother and
fetus ... by its nature should preclude criminal prosecution
for prenatal injuries that are anything short of a malicious or
intentional infliction of injury or short of a manifested extreme indifference to the woman's own body and her fetus's
imminent human life.
Judith Kahn, Note, Of Woman's First Disobedience: Forsaking a Duty of Care to Her
Fetus-Is This a Mother's Crime?, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 807, 809, 815, 824 (1987); see
also Manson & Marolt, supra note 80, at 174-77. A similar argument has been made with
regard to civil maternal liability for fetal injury.
[H)olding a mother liable for unintentionally injuring her unborn child would subject to state scrutiny all the decisions a
woman must make in attempting to carry a pregnancy to
term, and would infringe on her right to privacy and bodily
autonomy.... [T)he imposition of such liability would render
her a guarantor of the child's condition at birth, and from the
moment of conception until birth the two would be potential
legal adversaries .... [T)he relationship between a pregnant
woman and her fetus is unlike that between any other plaintiff
and defendant, since no other plaintiff depends exclusively on
any other defendant for everything necessary to life itself, and
no other defendant must endure profound and possibly lifethreatening biological changes to bring forth an adversary into
the world .... [W)hether prejudicial and stereotypical beliefs
about the reproductive abilities of women could be kept from
interfering with a jury's determination whether a particular
women was negligent at any point during her pregnancy [is
questionable).
Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Right of Child to Action Against Mother for Infliction
of Prenatal Injuries, 78 A.L.R. 4th 1082, 1090-91 (1990) (discussing Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988)). But see Comment, supra note 104, at 388-89.
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Moreover, exposing pregnant women to liability for manslaughter of their own fetuses would likely be ineffective as a
deterrant l06 and counterproductive to the goals of promoting fetal and maternal health.lo7 Furthermore, there are more effective
and less intrusive means of addressing the problem of maternal
prenatal misconduct, such as more accessible and inexpensive
prenatal health care and substance abuse treatment programs. lOS
106. The prospect of criminal punishment is not likely to deter a woman who is not
already deterred by the prospect of having to care for a child that is born unhealthy
because of her prenatal misconduct. Bonnie, supra note 103, at 22; see Manson &
Marolt, supra note 80, at 172. But see Logli, supra note 104, at 26-27.
107. It has been argued that:
The knowledge that personal [medical) records might be
disclosed [to police) could destroy a woman's trust in her doctor and cause her to conceal facts which could be vital to both
her health and the health of her fetus. The additional threat
of criminal sanctions could actually injure the fetus by. frightening the pregnant woman away from all types of prenatal
care.
. . . Since the child must remain with the mother after
birth, there must be a healthy prenatal relationship between
the mother and her fetus. If the mother feels that having the
child deprived her of her autonomy, she may unconsciously
blame the child for the intrusion. Further, since the mother is
physiologically linked to the fetus, any emotional suffering imposed on the mother by the state will probably cause the child
to suffer too. Also, a mother's emotional distress can cause
pregnancy disorders, premature delivery, or stillbirth.
Manson & Marolt, supra note 80, at 172-73; see Wendy K. Mariner et ai., Pregnancy,
Drugs, and the Perils of Prosecution, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS. Winter/Spring 1990, at 30, 3637. But see Logli, supra note 104, at 26-27.
108. See Manson & Marolt, supra note 80, at 176-77; e.g., Alcohol and Drug Affected Mothers and Infants Act of 1990, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11757.50-11758
(West 1991).
Prosecutors argue that the purpose of these arrests is to
get women to stop using drugs, not to end their pregnancies.
But as Representative George Miller concluded after Congressional research and hearings on the subject, "[w)omen who
seek help for drug addiction during pregnancy cannot get
it." ...
The lack of appropriate drug treatment programs for
women is a nationw(de problem. Ann O'Reilly, Director of
Family and Children's Services for the San Francisco Department of Social Services stated, "If these mothers were walking
away from treatment, I might feel differently, but they are not
walking away from treatment-they're walking away from
waiting lists."
Moreover, ending an addiction without help is virtually
impossible. According to Martha Nencioli, a clinical nurse who
counsels pregnant women seeking drug treatment, "very few
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, although the Flores decision may be criticized
on a procedural basis 109 and for its use of Health and Safety
Code section 7180(a) to determine whether a fetus has been
born alive,l1O it cannot be criticized for continuing to follow the
common law "born alive" rule because this is consistent with
clear legislative intent.11l Accordingly, whether manslaughter of
a fetus should be a crime is a question for the Legislature to
answer.ll2 If the Legislature chooses to make it a crime, the privacy rights of pregnant women justify exempting them from liawomen can stop on their own."
Lynn M. Paltrow, When Becoming Pregnant is a Crime. CRIM. JUST. ETHICS. Winter/
Spring 1990, at 41, 42 (footnotes omitted).
109. Evidence that Ms. Bacon's fetus had a weak heartbeat for up to five minutes
arguably established "sufficient cause" to hold the defendant to answer under common
law standards of what constitutes "live birth." See supra notes 18-20, 32, 36-37 and accompanying text; Morgan v. State, 256 S.W. 433, 434 (Tenn. 1923); see People v. Bolar,
440 N.E.2d 639, 643-45 (Ill. Ct. App. 1982). The fact that Morgan involved acts which
occurred after delivery is irrelevant since live birth still must be proved and the same
standards have heretofore been used to prove it. Indeed, the Flores court impliedly admitted to some uncertainty in the result that would be reached under common law standards. See supra text accompanying note 45. Moreover, whether Ms. Bacon's fetus was
born alive was a question of fact for the jury. People v. Chavez, 176 P.2d 92, 95 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1947). In any event, the Flores court adopted Health and Safety Code section
7180(a) as the new test for live birth. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. The
proper procedure apparently therefore should have been to remand the case for another
preliminary hearing to give the prosecution an opportunity to satisfy this new test.
110. Section 7180(a) does afterall define "death," not "born alive." And there is no
evidence that the Legislature intended it to define "born alive." On the contrary, since
the Legislature intends "human being" to have its common law meaning of a person
"born alive," it seems inescapable that it intends "born alive" to have its common law
meaning as well. Perhaps the court was merely attempting to justify adopting a more
easily applied rule for what constitutes "born alive" than the morass of confusing and
often inconsistent common law rules.
It should also be noted that the required proof of brain activity under section
7180(a) is an almost insurmountable burden.
Defendant's contention that brain activity be required for
a finding of live birth is a luxury that is impossible to afford.
Testimony at trial indicated that this could only be conclusively established through use of an electroencephalogram.
Though no testimony was adduced we believe that constraints
of time, availability of equipment, and incompatability with
life-saving measures renders this requirement totally
impractical.
People v. Bolar, 440 N.E.2d 639, 644 (Ill. App. 1982). However, the Flores court left open
the possibility that brain activity could be inferred from respiration (breathing). See
supra note 50.
111. See supra notes 41, 70-77 and accompanying text.'
112. See supra note 78-79 and accompanying text,
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bility, as they are for fetal murder.ll3
The Flores decision raises one of the most controversial and
heavily-debated subjects of our time: fetal rights. IH Making
manslaughter of a fetus a crime would send California one step
further down the slippery slope of fetal rights. I lIi In their wellintentioned zeal to protect fetuses, the Legislature must be ever
cognizant of the trade-off between fetal rights and women's
rights; according rights to fetuses often means taking rights
away from women. ll6 The California Legislature must be careful
not to elevate fetuses to first class citizens at the cost of making
women second class ones.117
Brian R. Paget*

113. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
114. See People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203, 208 (Ill. 1980) ("The extent to which the
unborn child is accorded the legal status of one already born is one of the most debated
questions of our time."). Put another way, the Flores decision raises the question-when
does life begin? Different societies have adopted vastly different views on the nature of
human life and the point at which it begins and is legally protectible. MacCartee, supra
note 65, at 273. See generally Webb, supra note 65, at 183-85 (discussing ancient Greek,
Catholic, and Jewish theories of life).
115. Paltrow, supra note 108, at 42.
In the eyes of many, the spector of continuing women's
oppression looms large, and the prospect of a slippery slope
that will erode hard-won reproductive freedoms is seriously
entertained. Although fetal endangerment during the third trimester is not "protected" as a privacy interest by Roe v.
Wade, the recent prosecutions are sometimes believed to be
part and parcel of the'increasing pressure to which that decision is being subjected.
John Kleinig, Criminal Liability for Fetal Endangerment, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS. Winter/
Spring 1990, at 11, 11.
116. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
117. See Manson & Marolt, supra note 80, at 177 ("By elevating the legal status of
the fetus, it is possible that the courts and legislatures will disregard or subordinate the
rights of the pregnant woman.").
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993.
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Insurance company did not violate the Unruh Civil Rights Act
when it refused to issue an umbrella liability insurance policy
to a homosexual couple on the grounds that they were not
married.
SUMMARY

Beaty v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 8 Cal Rptr. 2d 593
(1992). In Beaty v. Truck Insurance Exchange l , the California
Court of Appeal unanimously held that two men who lived together in a homosexual relationship for eighteen years were not
discriminated against in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act2
when defendant insurance company refused to issue them a joint
umbrella liability insurance policy.a Specifically, the court held
that defendant insurance company's refusal to issue joint umbrella coverage policies to unmarried couples did not discriminate against plaintiffs on the basis of sexual orientation:' The
court refused to extend the Unruh Act to include marital status
as a protected category. I! In addition, the court found that defendant insurance company had a legitimate business purpose
for using marital status to determine eligibility for joint umbrella liability policies. 6
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs Larry Beaty and Boyce Hinman, a gay couple,
lived together for eighteen years. They bought a home, taking
title as joint tenants, in 1984. They maintained joint credit card
and bank accounts and jointly owned two cars and the furnishings in their home. Their wills and life insurance policies each
named the other as primary beneficiary. Defendant Truck Insur1. Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exchange. 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593 (1992).
2. Unruh Civil Rights Act. CAL: CIV. CODE §§ 51-52 (West 1983).
3. Beaty. 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595.
4. Id. at 597.

5.Id.
6. Id. at 599.
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ance Exchange issued them joint homeowners and automobile
insurance policies. 7
Plaintiffs applied for a joint umbrella liability insurance
policy8 from defendant in the amount of one million dollars, but
defendant denied their application on the grounds that such policies are only issued to married couples. 9 Defendant offered
plaintiffs separate insurance policies, each with its own premium, but plaintiffs refused the policies because they wanted a
joint policy with the same premium as would be charged a married couple. lo
Plaintiffs requested that the California Department of Insurance rule on whether defendant's refusal to issue them a joint
umbrella policy violated sections 679.71 and 1852 of the California Insurance Code. l l The Department informed plaintiffs that
it would take no action on their behalf, but plaintiffs were free
to pursue any legal remedies. 12
In September 1989, plaintiffs filed a complaint in superior
court, seeking damages, injunctive and declaratory relief. IS
Plaintiffs asserted that the insurance company violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act l • and sections 679.71 and 1861.05 111 of the
7. [d. at 594-95.

8. Umbrella liability insurance policies are sold at comparatively low cost and pick
up where primary coverage ends. These policies give financi~l security and peace of mind
to the insured. 8A ApPLEMAN. INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4909.85 (1981); Beaty, 8
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595.
9. Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595.
10. [d. at 594.
11. California Insurance Code Section 679.71 prohibits discrimination by an insurer
on the basis of marital status, sex, race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry. This
section also prohibits the use of these categories in risk prediction. Insurance companies
set rates and grant or deny coverage based upon their prediction of risk of insuring a
certain person or thing. CAL. INS. CODE § 679.71 (West 1983). Section 1852, now repealed,
related to standards applicable to rates. CAL. INS. CODE § 1852 (repealed 1988).
12. Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595.
13. [d.

14. The Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-52 (West 1983). California
Civil Code Section 51 provides in part:
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free
and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion,
ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other physical disability are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.
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California Insurance Code. 16 The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the action. 17 On appeal, plaintiffs argued only that defendant's refusal
to issue them a joint umbrella policy constituted arbitrary and
unlawful discrimination within the meaning of the Unruh Civil
.
.
Rights Act. 1s
COURT'S ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs argued that defendant insurance company violated the Unruh Act by discriminating against them in two ways.
They alleged discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation and on the basis of their marital status. 19
I.

SEXUAL ORIENTATION

The court first held that the insurance company did not discriminate against plaintiffs on the basis' of their sexual orientation 20 and thus did not violate the Unruh Act based on that classification.21 The court, citing its earlier decision in Hinman v.
This section shall not be construed to confer any right or
privilege on a person which is conditioned or limited by law or
which is applicable alike to persons of [the above enumerated
categories]" CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1983).
California Civil Code Section 52 provides in part: "Whoever ... makes any discrimination, distinction or restriction on account of sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other physical disability ... is liable for each and every
such offense." CAL. CIV. CODE § 52 (West 1983).'
15. California Insurance Code Section 1861.05 forbids approval of rates which are
unfairly discriminatory or otherwise in violation of the Insurance Code. CAL. INS. CODE §
1861.05 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992).
16. Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594.
17. Id. at 595.
18. }d.
19. Id. at 596-97.
20. In reference to the term "sexual orientation", the court stated in a footnote,
"We use the term 'sexual orientation' to refer generally to a person's sexual habits, practices, predilections, or compulsions with respect to heterosexuality, homosexuality, etc."
Id. at 596.
21. Sexual orientation is not one of the characteristics specifically enumerated in the
Unruh Act. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1983). However, courts have held that the Unruh
Act forbids discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The court in Beaty cited
the following cases supporting that proposition: Rolon v. Kulwitzky, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217
(1984); Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1983);
Hubert v. Williams, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1982).
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Department of Personnel Administration,22 stated that all unmarried couples were treated the same by defendant insurance
company.23 Therefore, the company did not discriminate against
plaintiffs on the basis of their homosexuality since all unmarried
couples, heterosexual or homosexual, were denied joint umbrella
liability coverage by defendant.24 Thus, plaintiffs' claim that defendant violated the Unruh Act by discriminating on the basis of
sexual orientation failed.

II. MARITAL STATUS
The court next evaluated whether plaintiffs could sustain
their claim of discrimination on the basis of marital status in
violation of the Unruh Act. 211 The court held they could not, because the Unruh Act could not be extended to include marital
status, and because the insurance company had a legitimate business purpose in using marital status as a factor to assess eligibility for umbrella coverage liability policies. 26
A.

UNRUH ACT NOT EXTENDED TO INCLUDE MARITAL STATUS

The court cited Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV to
support its decision not to extend the Unruh Act to include marital status as an additional protected category.27 The court read
Harris as concluding that the Legislature intended the scope of
22. Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1985).
23. In Hinman, the same plaintiffs as in the instant case brought an action against
the Department of Personnel Administration (DPA) asserting a violation of their constitutional rights to equal protection. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
court's holding that the state's policy of denying dental benefits to unmarried partners of
state employees did not unlawfully discriminate against homosexual employees in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The DPA offered dental coverage only to married couples and did not distinguish
between heterosexual and homosexual couples. Thus, the distinction applied equally to
all unmarried partners whether heterosexual or homosexual. [d. at 413.
24. Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596.
25. The Unruh Civil Rights Act does not include marital status as an enumerated
category protected from discrimination. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1983).
26. Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597.
27. In Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873 (Cal. 1991), the California Supreme Court held that a landlord did not discriminate against plaintiff tenants in
violation of the Unruh Act by refusing to rent to them when their income was less than
three times the rent because the criterion applied uniformly and neutrally to all persons
regardless of personal characteristics. The court refused to extend the act to protect
against such action.
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the Unruh Act to be confined to discrimination specifically enumerated within the Act. 28 In Beaty, the court stated that although Harris did not overrule prior case law in which the Unruh Act was extended to classifications not specifically
enumerated, Harris did require'careful weighing so that any fu~
ture expansion of protected categories would be consistent with
legislative intent. 29 The court in Beaty found that the Legislature intended to confine the Unruh Act to the categories enumerated in Sections 51 and 52 of the California Civil Code. 30
The court reasoned that if the Legislature had intended to include marital status in the list of protected categories, it would
have done so explicitly since it used a specific list in two separate code sections of the Unruh Act. 31
In deciding not to extend the Unruh Act to include marital
status as a protected category, the court stated "there is a strong
policy in this state in favor of marriage"32, and that including
marital status among the protected categories would frustrate
this policy.33 The court further stated that the Legislature, and
not the courts, should determine whether nonmarital relationships deserve the same protection afforded marital relationships.34 The court cited several statutes in which the Legislature
included the term "marital status" in anti-discrimination legislation. 31i Thus, since the Legislature has used the term in other
forms of anti-discrimination statutes, it would have used, the
28, Beaty, 8 CaL Rptr. 2d at 597.
29. Id.
30.ld.
3!. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51, 52 (West 1983),
32, The court cited the following cases as support for this proposition: Elden v.
Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (CaL 1988); Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 663 P.2d
904 (CaL 1983); and Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin. 213 CaL Rptr. 410
(1985). Beaty, 8 CaL Rptr. 2d at 598.
33. Beaty, at 598.
34. Id. at ~OO.
35. Among the statutes cited by the court were: CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 125.6
(West 1990); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 798.20 (West 1982); 1812.30 (West 1985); CAL. CORP.
CODE §§ 5047.5, (West 1990); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 45293 (West 1978); CAL. ELEC. CODE §
308 (West 1977 and Supp. 1992); CAL. FIN. CODE § 40101 (West 1983); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 8310, 12920-21, 12926-27, 12930-31, 12935, 12940, 12955, 12993, 12995, 18500, 19572,
19702, 19704, 19793, 54701.12, 65583 (West 1983); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY C;ODE §§
1365.5,33050, 33435, 33436, 33724, 33769, 35811, 37630, 37923, 50955, 51602 (West 1990);
CAL. INS. CODE § 679.71 (West 1983); CAL. PROB. CODE § 401 (West 1991); CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE §§ 5080.18, 5080.34 (West 1984); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 10000, 18907 (West
1991). Beaty, 8 CaL Rptr. 2d at 598.
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term in the Unruh Act as well, had it intended marital status to
be a protected category.36
The language of Civil Code Section 51 indicates that the
Legislature did not intend to create rights or privileges, but
rather intended only to assure that once a business establishment extended a service, the service be available without discrimination based on the enumerated attributes. Thus, so long
as defendant insurer's policy was applicable alike to all persons
regardless of race, color, sex, religion, etc. 37 , it did not violate the
Unruh Act. Here, the defendant's practice of issuing joint umbrella coverage policies only to married couples applies equally
to the above categories and therefore does not violate the Unruh
Act. 3s
B.

LEGITIMATE BUSINESS PURPOSE

The court held that although the Unruh Act forbids discrimination on an arbitrary basis,39 the defendant did not discriminate arbitrarily as it possessed a legitimate business purpose which justified different treatment.40 The insurance
company could use marital status in predicting risk and conclude that an unmarried couple lacks the assurance of permanence necessary to assess with confidence the risks insured
against in a joint umbrella policy.41 The court cited Hinman as
support for its conclusion that requiring insurance companies to
use some other means to predict risk would be an undue burden.42 In order to assess the risk with regard to unmarried
couples, the insurer would be required to undertake a "massive
intrusion" into the applicants' privacy by asking questions about
36. Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598.
37. The court cited the portion of California Civil Code Section 51 which provides:
"This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person which is
conditioned or limited by law or which is applicable alike to persons of every sex, color,
race, religion, ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other physical disability." [d.
38. Id.
39. Although the Unruh Act does not contain specific language prohibiting arbitrary
discrimination, the California Supreme Court has interpreted the Act as prohibiting such
discrimination. Harris, 805 P.2d at 878; In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992 (Cal. 1970); Beaty, 8 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 598.
40. Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598.
41. Id. at 599.
42. Id.
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their relationship which would lead to inconsistent results,43
The court stated that the consequences of upholding plaintiffs' claim would be that defendant and the court would have to
treat plaintiffs as a married unit. Married couples are entitled to
receive special consideration. 44 The court found that extending
the Unruh Act to include plaintiffs would contravene the strong
public policy in favor of marriage. The court finally concluded
that plaintiffs must look to the Legislature if they wish to legitimize the status of a homosexual partner. 45
CRITIQUE

The court's claim that defendant insurance company did
not discriminate against plaintiffs on the basis of their sexual
orientation because defendant insurance company refused to issue joint umbrella policies to all unmarried couples 46 is not convincing. Heterosexual couples can get married if they wish,
which allows them to receive the economic benefits of marriage
such as joint umbrella liability policies. Homosexual couples,
however, do not have any recourse as their marriages are not
recognized by law. 47 They cannot receive the benefits of being
married even though they intend to stay together permanently
and live in all respects as a married couple. The court should
have considered this factor when deciding whether exclusion of
unmarried couples from joint umbrella liability policies really
did discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
The court's finding that defendant did not violate the Unruh Act by discriminating on the basis of marital status is
equally unconvincing.
First, the court's reasoning for refusing to extend the Unruh
Act to cover discrimination on the basis of marital status is unpersuasive. The court incorrectly read Harris as absolutely
prohibiting courts from extending the Unruh Act to cover dis43.Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 600.
46. Id. at 596.
47. The California Civil Code defines marriage to be a civil contract between a man
and a woman. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1983). Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 600.
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crimination based on marital status. In Harris, the California
Supreme Court refused to extend the Unruh Act to cover discrimination based on economic status. The plaintiffs in that case
were denied the opportunity to rent an apartment because their
income did not amount to three times the amount of the rent,
even though they could afford the rent.48 The court in Harris
did find that the Legislature intended to limit the scope of the
Unruh Act to enumerated characteristics and similar personal
characteristics having nothing to do with the economic ability to
pay rent, but did not find that the Act covered only the enumerated characteristics. 49 Arguably, marital status is like the allowable prote'cted categories in that a marriage certificate does not
indicate ability to pay for something. It does indicate a personal
status of a person, defining whether or not he or she is involved
in a legally recognized relationship. Thus, marital status is more
like a personal characteristic, such as religious beliefs or geographical origin,IIO than an economic characteristic, such as earning more than three times the rent of an apartment. III The court
in Harris cited other decisions in which the Unruh Act was expanded based on personal characteristics such as unusual
clothes or dress, age, and homosexuality and did not ov.errule
them. 1I2 Thus, Harris requires careful scrutiny before extending
the Unruh Act's enumerated categories, but does not completely
prohibit such extension.
The court also found that since the Legislature included the
term "marital status" in other legislation, it would have used the
term in the Unruh Act if it intended to include that class as a
protected category.1I3 However, this argument ignores the fact
that the Legislature has not made contrary changes to the Unruh Act following cases where unlisted personal characteristics
were included as protected under the Act.1I4 The Legislature is
48. Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873, 874 (Cal. 1991).
49. Harris, 805 P.2d at 883.
50. Religious beliefs and geographical origin are enumerated in the Unruh Act. CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 51-52 (West 1983).
.
51. Harris, 805 P.2d at 874.
52. Among the cases cited were In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992 (Cal. 1970) (unconventional
dress or physical appearance); Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1982)
(families with minor children); Rolon v. Kulwitzy, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1984) (homosexuality). Harris, 805 P.2d at 879.
53. Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598.
54. Harris, 805 P.2d at 880.
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presumed to have knowledge of appellate court decisions. 55 If
the Legislature really intended to limit the Unruh Act to only
the enumerated categories, then it would have enacted or
amended legislation, after these cases, where. the terms of the
new legislation would specifically state that the Act could not be
extended to protect categories not included in its language.
Third, the court was unpersuasive when it decided that the
insurance company had a legitimate business interest in issuing
joint umbrella policies to married couples only. The court's conclusion that marital status is a reliable way to predict risk (because an unmarried couple lacks assurance of permanence 56 ) in
insuring couples jointly fails in light of the fact that fifty percent
of all new marriages are destined to end in divorce. 57
In addition, the court's finding that requiring insurance
companies to use some other means to predict risk would be an
undue burden lacks merit. Insurance companies could continue
evaluating risk of insuring or providing coverage to a married
couple simply by looking at their marriage certificate. They
could evaluate risk in insuring unmarried couples by utilizing a
.
simple questionnaire. 58
The court found that the insurer would be required to undertake a massive intrusion into the privacy of unmarried
couples to evaluate their insurance risk. 59 However, this intrusion could entail nothing more than general questions about
55. [d. at 879 ..
56. One writer commented:
"Policies that treat married and unmarried couples differently are demeaning to unmarried lesbian and gay couples.
Such policies lend credence to the stereotype that nonmarital
relationships are transitory, frivolous, morally reprehensible,
or simply unimportant. These stereotypes are grounded in a
marital status classification that arbitrarily defines relationships in purely legal as opposed to factual terms."
John C. Beattie, Note, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal for the
Protection of Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1415, 1435 (1991).
57. Rochelle L. Stanfield, Valuing the Family, 24 NAT'L J. No. 27 at 1562 (July
1992).
58. The questionnaire could ask questions that would indicate stability in the relationship. Examples of these are: how long the couple has lived together, whether their
home, cars, and other belongings are owned jointly, whether they have joint bank accounts or credit cards, and whether they have any other joint insurance policies.
59. Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. ·2d at 595.
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their relationship. These types of questions are certainly not as
intrusive as questions asked when people apply for health or life
insurance. There, applicants must answer detailed questions
about medical history and often submit to a physical examination, including a urine or blood test. In addition, unmarried
couples who did not wish to answer questions about their relationship could opt for individual umbrella policies. The option
of applying for joint coverage should not be denied to couples
simply because the court feigns concern for their privacy.
Finally, the Court avoided its duty when it concluded that
plaintiffs must wait for legislation if they wish to legitimize the
status of homosexual partners. Courts should step in to contravene injustice when the Legislature is slow to act.60 It is the
courts' duty to spot flaws or omissions in the law and to issue
decisions to correct them.
CONCLUSION
In the modern world, a continually increasing number of
couples, both heterosexual and homosexual, make homes together outside of the legal bonds of marriage. 61 Where, as in
Beaty, a couple has lived together a very long time, and has established a financial base together, it is sad that the court is so
quick to allow a business establishment to differentiate, for socalled risk prediction purposes, between them and a legally married couple. The only true difference between the two is that the
latter had participated in a legal ceremony and has a piece of
paper called a marriage certificate.
This result is especially disheartening when the couple is
gay and is prohibited from forming a legally recognized union.
While the Beaty case reflects the current state of the law regarding unmarried couples, hopefully, there will be a day when
60. The United States Supreme Court defined the role of courts to apply a more
searching judicial inquiry to protect discrete and insular minorities. See United States v.
Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
61. See John C. Beattie, Note, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal for the Protection of Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINGS L. J. 1415 (1991).
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courts, legislatures, and businesses form policies that conform to
the realities of today's diverse society.
Helen Silva*

* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1994.
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